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Forensics capability is becoming increasingly important for the 
enterprise/network environment. Therefore, businesses need to find an 
optimised forensics solution that suits the high level business/forensics 
requirements. However, most businesses are still staying with the 
conventional method of digital investigation, which means using forensics 
tools to retrieve evidential data from the target system. Many businesses lack 
a comprehensive model to help understand the forensics requirements on 
different levels. Also, businesses lack a method to integrate and manage 
forensics knowledge into daily operation.  
In this research, a forensics overlay is being developed on an existing 
business framework – SABSA model. The overlay helps different business 
roles to understand and apply forensics knowledge into their daily tasks. With 
help of the overlay, businesses are able to reduce the overreliance on the 
third party forensics tools through developing their own forensically sound 
applications. To test the theory of forensically sound application development, 
and evaluate the usability of the overlay, a forensically sound email client is 
designed and developed accordingly. 
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1 Introduction 
This project analyses the deficiencies of current forensics models. To 
overcome these deficiencies, a new forensics model is built for enhancing 
digital investigation capability in a business environment.  In addition, this 
project also analyses the overly reliance of third party forensics tools and 
propose that businesses construct their own forensics application and further 
develop a business/forensics environment. To improve the usability of the 
new model and demonstrate that a business/forensics environment can be 
less dependent on the third party forensics tools, an email client (the most 
sought-after business application) is designed and developed according to 
current forensics standards. This project was motivated by several questions. 
Why a new forensics model is needed? What are the deficiencies of current 
forensics models? What is needed in the new forensics model? Why a daily 
used application such as an Email Client needs built-in forensics features? 
And how the new forensics model helps design forensics features? This 
chapter briefly explores answers to these questions. More detailed analysis is 
provided in later chapters. 
 
Chapter One: 
1.1 Describes the Current Digital Forensics Environment 
1.2  Introduces the Concept of Forensically Sound Applications (FSAs)  
1.3  Introduces the Current Research Progresses and Goals 
 
1.1 Current Digital Forensics Environment 
To briefly answer some of the questions raised previously, section 1.1 gives a 
general picture of the current forensics landscape and key forensics research 
objectives and also introduces the methodology that guides the development 
of a forensics model. 
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1.1.1 Law Enforcement Elements in the Previous Forensics Landscape  
Emerging in the 1980s, digital forensics has evolved to become an integral 
part of many legal case investigations. Digital forensics evolves with new 
techniques, concepts, legal frameworks, and forensics regulations. In recent 
years, some revolutionary technological developments have shaped the 
forensics landscape into a new form in which digital forensics has been widely 
adopted in the business world.  
 
In previous forensics landscapes, one of the most essential preconditions of 
digital forensics was to meet the requirements of the key stakeholder – Law 
Enforcement, seen in Figure 1-1. The forensics standards and legal case 
precedent are studied to provide forensics requirements for forensics 
operations. The most frequently used (or conventional) method to conduct 
digital investigation is to use tools that have built-in forensics features to 
collect, preserve and analyse evidential data. These forensics features are 
designed, implemented and tested in a manner according to the requirements 
from forensics regulation authorities so that the tools are able to extract 
evidence from the target system. Design and development of current 
forensics tools are continually being challenged by two major factors. Firstly, 
anti-forensics techniques and new technologies such as virtualisation, cloud 
computing and distributed computing [1] [2]; secondly, it is also challenged by 
the expanding scope of digital forensics. 
 
This research focuses on the expanding scope of digital forensics and its 
impact on various levels of digital forensics activities. 
  
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- 1 Forensics Entities 
 
1.1.2 The Corporate Elements in the Current Forensics Landscape  
The motivation to develop a new forensics model is that the current models 
cannot match the expanding digital forensics scope. One of the most 
important additions to digital forensics scope is additional stakeholders such 
as corporate environments. An increasing number of enterprise digital crimes 
have brought corporations and government agencies, into the battlefield 
against cyber crimes and cyber terrorism. Therefore, organisational decisions 
and forensic regulations need to be considered equally in the current 
forensics landscape, seen in Figure 1-2. A new forensics model is needed to 
provide both business and forensics views for an enterprise forensics 
environment. 
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Figure 1- 2 Updated Forensics Entities 
Current models have a narrow view to address forensics issues, focusing only 
on a technical and operational level. Technical forensics models usually focus 
on using tools in analysing a typical system or application. If the system or 
application is updated, the technical focused model may not be able to cope 
with the updated system. This results in businesses overly relying on 
forensics tools. On the other hand, operational forensics models usually focus 
on forensics activities phases, roles and responsibilities. It follows that 
businesses seeks compliance with forensics standards or business policies 
rather than designing a forensics solution which suits the typical problem. 
These are the major deficiencies of current forensics models. 
 
The forensics community has noticed that the digital investigation capability 
should be initiated by high level business requirements and not by the 
provision of third party vendor‘s forensics tools. The first step to enhance an 
enterprise digital investigative/Electronic discovery capability is to identify 
business/forensics requirements from the strategic level [3]. Therefore, the 
new forensics model should provide an end-to-end (from business forensics 
requirement to physical forensics features) forensics solution to 
network/enterprise environments. 
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1.2 Forensically Sound Applications (FSAs) 
To further solve the problem of overly relying on forensics tools, the second 
objective of this research is to test the proposed idea of designing and 
developing a forensically sound application using the new forensics model.  
 
In Figure 1-2, the business systems and applications are the victims of 
cybercrimes while forensics tools collect the evidence from cybercrimes. The 
idea of FSAs aims to design the forensics features in business systems and 
applications so that they are not only cybercrime victims but also provide the 
functions of collecting evidence. In an ideal business forensics environment, 
shown in Figure 1-3, the business consists of various forensically sound 
systems, subsystems, and applications. Therefore, businesses design their 
own environment according to their forensics requirements.  
 
 
 
Figure 1- 3 FSAs for Corporate Environment 
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1.2.1 Challenges of the Forensics Tools Development 
In the business component level that focuses on third party tools, recent 
research [4] shows that during 2005 to 2010, a significant amount of forensics 
suites such as EnCase and FTK have moved into the network/enterprise 
environment for electronic discovery purposes. It follows that the forensics 
tool development faces the challenges from understanding various business 
requirements and integrating them into software development process. Failure 
to fulfil the business requirement leads to the low forensics tools‘ compatibility. 
Challenged by increasingly changing business and technology environments, 
forensics tools are required to provide better acquisition, as well as faster and 
more efficient analysis [5]. Other challenges include forensics tools requiring 
long term testing before being ready to launch into the market and to be 
recognised as mainstream [6].  
 
With all these challenges, the development of forensics tools faces 
tremendous amount of workload in 1) researching and gathering common 
corporate forensics requirements, 2) designing forensics features, 3) 
developing software and 4) long term testing. Most importantly, commercial 
forensics tools have to strictly meet overall requirements from law 
enforcement and businesses since commercial forensics tools serve the 
primary goal of prosecution, while business FSAs serve the primary goal of 
maintaining the business service with a secondary goal of prosecution. It is 
not efficient to use the same tools for different goals.  
 
1.2.2 Define “Forensically Sound”  
The entire process of designing and developing FSAs is actually to define this 
term in both the conceptual and physical level.  
 
In the conceptual level, according to McKemmish, R. (2008) [7] ―forensically 
sound‖ means ―The application of a transparent digital forensic process that 
preserves the original meaning of the data for production in a court of law.‖ 
There are four criteria for the term forensically sound, as shown in Table 1-1. 
Furthermore, the newly developed forensics model defines what ―forensically 
sound‖ means in a corporate application.  
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In the physical level, according to the newly developed forensics model, a 
forensically sound email client is developed with built-in forensics features. 
Criterion Description 
Meaning Has the meaning and, therefore, the interpretation of the 
electronic evidence been unaffected by the digital forensic 
process? 
Error Have all errors been reasonably identified and satisfactorily 
explained so as to remove any doubt over the reliability of the 
evidence? 
Transparency Is the digital forensic process capable of being independently 
examined and verified in its entirety? 
Experience Has the digital forensic analysis been undertaken by an 
individual with sufficient and relevant experience? 
 
Table 1- 1 Criterion for Forensically Sound  
 
1.3 Research Progress and Proposed Solution 
This research reviews the current landscapes of digital forensics and studies 
current forensics models. Learning that the current forensics models generally 
lack an overall view of the forensics landscape, we designed and built an end-
to-end forensics model which contains different layers in the 
business/forensics environment. The model solves the problems of 1) lacking 
forensics consideration during business application development; 2) overly 
relying on forensics tools in a corporate environment. It further helps 
businesses in building forensics capabilities, dealing with corporate digital 
discovery issues and managing forensics related projects. 
 
There are two outcomes for this project. The first outcome is a newly 
designed forensics model called the Forensics Overlay (the Overlay), which is 
using the SABSA (Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture) matrix 
(see Section 1.4). The second outcome is (see Section 1.5) a forensically 
sound email client, designed and developed through the guidance of the 
overlay. See Figure 1-4. 
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Figure 1- 4 Research & Proposed Solution 
 
1.3.1 Forensics Overlay Development Process 
The forensics overlay development is based on SABSA methodology which is 
elaborated in the book entitled Enterprise Security Architecture [8]. It is a 
business driven philosophy that has practical implications on designing 
security architecture.  
 
SABSA Matrix 
The core of SABSA methodology is a 6x6 SABSA matrix. The forensics 
overlay development process is to populate thirty six SABSA matrix cells with 
forensics concerns. Vertically, it contains six layers (contextual, conceptual, 
logical, physical, component and operational) which represent six categories 
of stakeholders‘ views on enterprise security. Horizontally, it contains six 
questions of ―what, why, how, who, where and when‖. Within this matrix, each 
cell is one enterprise security issue presented as a question. For example 
conceptual asset cell presents the question of ―What is your business 
attributes profile‖. This matrix has been widely used to develop solutions for 
other system architecture, for example, End-to-End Framework for Survivable 
Next Generation Networks (NGNs) [9] and SABSA cyber security solution [10].  
 
SABSA Lifecycle 
SABSA lifecycle covers all layers of the SABSA matrix. It includes Strategy & 
Concept, Design, Implement and Operations. See Figure 1-5. 
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Figure 1- 5 SABSA Lifecycle 
SABSA lifecycle is very similar to FSAs development lifecycle. The iterative 
process includes defining business drives, extracting business requirements, 
designing business & forensics services, implementing physical forensics 
features and testing these features. 
 
1.3.2 Forensics Overlay 
The overlay is the proposed new forensics model. It builds on top of the 
SABSA matrix. To build the overlay, not all the SABSA matrix cells are going 
to be populated; only those that have association with corporate forensics 
issues. All the issues in these associated cells are addressed and provide 
meaning in terms of forensics instead of security. For example, in the 
Contextual Layer Asset cell, the issues needing to be addressed are 
forensics/business drivers (not security drivers). 
 
  
10 
 
The forensics overlay combines the elements from the SABSA Matrix and 
forensics knowledge. It has the following properties that are inherited from the 
SABSA methodology: 
 
 Business Driven Approach: SABSA methodology originally includes an 
entire layer to address the business issues such as business drivers, 
processes, business consideration of time, locations, etc. In terms of 
our project, the SABSA business considerations are equivalent to 
requirements from various forensics standards, guidelines, 
frameworks, methodologies etc.  
 
 Traceability: the SABSA matrix originally provides the traceability to an 
Enterprise security architecture design. As a specific extension of it, the 
overlay inherits such advantage. The overlay traceability becomes very 
convenient, not only during the process of application development, but 
also when the application needs to be tested for usability and service. It 
also provides a clear view of how an application is designed and 
implemented according to forensics requirement. 
 
 Multiple Layered Stakeholder View: This feature solves the problem of 
the lack of comprehensive stakeholder consideration during application 
development. With multiple stakeholders view in terms of forensics 
process, we are able to develop an application considering the 
requirements from normal business users, law enforcement, forensics 
experts, programmers, etc.  
  
1.3.3 Forensically Sound Email Client Development Process 
For the increasing forensics challenges, a direct solution is to develop 
forensics tools that provide high speed hardware and software methods for 
data acquisition and more efficient data triage functionality in order to find 
data of interest. 
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Besides the time and effort invested on forensics tools development, we 
notice that some applications provide features that might help live forensics 
investigation. However, the features contained in these applications are not 
exclusively designed and developed with the intention to help digital 
investigation. For example, most web service providers use cookies to 
personalise the customers‘ access to the website. A cookie contains a user‘s 
privacy and important identification which can be used to identify the user. 
However, the contents in the cookies can be easily changed [11] and 
therefore they cannot be used for digital investigation purposes.  
 
Furthermore, these features are accessible for both investigators and 
suspects. That means suspects are able to delete the records in history, 
cookies and temp folder which leads investigators to rely on forensics tools. 
 
Our research proposes that reliance on forensics tools is not the only solution. 
The application itself can be developed in a forensics manner by the guidance 
of the overlay. For example, Web Browsing History, Cookies, and Temporary 
Internet files can be designed to keep the internet browsing data in a forensics 
manner and thus the data that has evidential value can only be accessible to 
forensics investigators. 
 
To test the overlay's ability in developing FSAs, we develop a forensically 
sound Email client. Email is the most sought-after and sometimes the only 
electronically stored information requested during digital discovery and it is 
defined as a business record by Federal rules [12]. During 2005 to 2010, 
Email has already become a major source of probative information and a 
forensics challenge [13]. Many corporate email software vendors have slowly 
added archiving and searching features that help investigators in their digital 
discovery needs, but most fall short. Current archiving and searching email 
features are designed without forensic consideration. Even though they 
appear to be designed to help static-forensics, they cannot provide obvious 
live forensics help alone since further assistance of forensics tools are still 
needed. 
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In our scenario, the email client is built according to the overlay which has its 
contextual layer focused on business strategy. In this case, business 
requirements are treated equally important as forensics requirements. 
Therefore, all forensics features are not randomly designed but follow the 
intention of the business. A forensically sound email client should at least:  
 
 Generate email evidence on a real time bases, which means major focus 
on email SENDING events; 
 Protect real-time evidence in a forensics manner, which means a clear 
presentation of the email client activities and protective mechanism for the 
record of these activities; 
 Be role-based, which means ordinary users and forensics investigators 
should have individual accounts to login to use the email client. 
 
1.3.4 Research Goals 
The first part of this research aims to analyse the current forensics landscape 
and relevant forensics models in order to discover the models‘ disadvantages. 
Afterwards, we determine the business requirements for digital evidence and 
the design of mechanisms to deliver the acceptable evidence for corporate 
forensics environments and admissible evidence for a court of law. We also 
study the current forensics knowledge and examine the law enforcement 
requirements including rules of evidence, current forensics standards and how 
these requirements are applied to the new forensics model. Furthermore, we 
intend to combine the determined business requirements and current 
forensics knowledge with the SABSA matrix to build the forensics overlay. 
 
The overlay provides an overall vision of an enterprise forensics situation and 
also complies with current forensics standards. It must inherit the properties 
from SABSA methodology and contain an end-to-end corporate forensics 
lifecycle. For businesses, the overlay can be use to organise corporate 
forensics strategy, determine formal corporate forensics requirements, design 
corporate forensics policies and services, help FSA development and 
deployment, select third party forensics tools and help handle corporate 
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forensics situations. For the SABSA matrix, the overlay also creates a new 
SABSA solution – The Enterprise Forensics Architecture. See Table 1-2. 
 
Architecture Layers Architecture Views 
Conceptual Enterprise and Law Enforcement‘s Forensics 
Objective 
Contextual Business and Forensics Attributes  
Design Business Forensics Policy and Service 
Physical Forensically Sound Applications (FSAs) Development  
Component Third Party Forensics Service Providers (Tool 
vendors) 
Operational Digital Forensics Investigation Rules and Guidelines 
 
Table 1- 2 Enterprise Forensics Architecture 
 
During the business application design and development, forensics issues are 
often overlooked. Such oversights in FSA development cause the business to 
overly rely on third party forensics tools which have difficulties and limitations. 
As a result of the second part research, we propose that the FSA 
development should follow the forensics overlay process. With more forensics 
features in business applications, corporate forensics teams spend less time 
and effort on extracting data for potential evidence. The evidence generated 
by the application should provide evidentiary value that complies with 
requirements from both business and law enforcement. Meanwhile, forensics 
tool vendors can reduce the workload on design and develop relevant 
features. 
 
This project argues that the new forensics model (the overlay) helps guide the 
corporate forensics environment development on an overall level. Meanwhile, 
current forensics tools are still trusted to evaluate, collect potential evidence 
and organise forensics reports for computer crimes and incidents.  
 
1.4 Related Work 
In the area of design and developed forensics features, McDonald, T. (2008) 
[75] examines and sets forth principles of operating system (OS) designs that 
may significantly increase the success of (future) forensic collection efforts 
and also lay out several OS design attributes that synergistically enhance 
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forensics activities. Their research, similar to [66] shows the urge forensics 
friendly operating system but not involved forensics friendly mainstream 
application design. 
 
Guo, Y. and J. Slay (2010) [82] provide a systematic description of the digital 
forensic discipline that is obtained by mapping its fundamental functions. The 
function mapping is used to construct a detailed function-oriented validation 
and verification framework for digital forensic tools. Their research focuses 
more on one single function – Data recovery for forensics tools, which has 
more technical focus rather than addressing the unavoidable 
enterprise/forensics issues. 
 
Both researches inspire our project that the forensics elements are very 
similar to security elements, which need to be designed with entire software 
development process to be functioning. Therefore, our project requires a 
business focused model to combine with forensics elements. For this reason, 
we selected the SABSA matrix. 
 
In the area of using an existing framework to design information technology 
solutions, the SABSA matrix was used to integrate with Survivable Network 
Assessment (SNA)/Risk Analysis & Probabilistic Survivability Assessment 
(RAPSA) and other existing approaches to deliver a coherent methodology for 
designing next generation networks with a business-driven level of 
survivability [26], more details are further explained in section 2.4. Our 
research utilised this previous experience to develop a forensics-related 
solution for mainstream application development.  
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1.5 Outline 
This chapter includes a discussion of the current forensics environment. It 
shows that enterprise entity is a major element of digital forensics industry. 
This chapter proposes a concept of forensically sound application (FSA) 
development. To apply this concept into physical usage in a business, this 
chapter outlines two major components of this research: 1) design and 
develop a forensics overlay to guide and FSA design process; 2) develop an 
email client according to the overlay‘s guidance. The following chapters of this 
thesis are as follows: 
 
Chapter Two introduces the foundational overlay design methodology - 
SABSA and its core framework - the SABSA matrix.  
 
Chapter Three briefly describes the evolution of cybercrime and digital 
forensics, along with the historical timeline of forensics standardisation. 
Chapter 3 also proposes to combine both forensics standards with the SABSA 
matrix as a blueprint of the forensics overlay.  
 
Chapter Four implements the blueprint from chapter 3 through the process of 
building a forensics overlay.  
 
Chapter Five recalls the proposed concept of FSA development via further 
explanation of the business information management in terms of static and 
live forensics. This chapter then provides an Enterprise Forensics 
investigation case study and related issues and propose a FSA development 
with the overlay as a solution. 
 
Chapter Six demonstrates a forensically sound email client design and 
implementation process with the overlay. 
  
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis and gives an overview of future work in 
this area. 
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2 Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture 
To develop the forensics overlay, Sherwood Applied Business Security 
Architecture (SABSA) is used as the foundational tool. SABSA is a 
methodology originally designed for developing risk-driven information 
security architectures for enterprises. It delivers security infrastructure 
solutions that support critical business initiatives. At the heart of the SABSA 
methodology is a six layered model, shown in Table 2-2. It is presented as a 
6x6 matrix, shown in Table 2-3. The SABSA matrix is a flexible framework 
that easily adopts and integrates with digital forensics knowledge. There are 
thirty-six compartments within the SABSA matrix which need to be addressed 
for corporate digital forensics. By addressing forensics issues in these cells, a 
forensics overlay is built. Depending on the scope of each cell SABSA 
provides features to help each addressing approach.  
 
Chapter Two: 
2.1 Introduces the SABSA Methodology 
2.2 Analyses the Details of the SABSA Model  
2.3 Explains the Benefit of SABSA Matrix for Building Forensics Overlay 
2.4 Introduces Previous Works of Using the SABSA Matrix 
2.5 Briefly Explains the Properties of the forensics Overlay 
 
2.1 What is SABSA? 
SABSA is an open standard, comprising a number of frameworks, models, 
methods and processes [14]. To build the security architecture for a business, 
SABSA users consider businesses as a system [15]. Therefore, a system 
approach can be applied to the construction of the enterprise security 
architecture. It separates a business system into sub-systems in order to 
simplify the complexity.  
 
In the early stages of SABSA, initial activities were conducted through 
teamwork such as interviewing the business owner, holding workshops for 
documenting business requirements, extracting business drivers and peer-
reviewing ideas among security experts to determine the SABSA attributes 
profiles. Through the entire SABSA process, the communication between 
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teams connects their views from different layers of expertise. The connection 
within all these layers help design the security mechanism that can trace back 
to its business driver decided in the early stage. 
 
Using the system approach in security architecture, the SABSA methodology 
provides four major visions for the SABSA related projects which are 1) Broad 
strategic objectives, 2) Awareness of Risks, 3) Simplify complexity and 4) 
Measuring performance against objectives. These four visions are adopted by 
the forensics overlay.  
 
2.1.1 Broad Strategic Objective  
SABSA enhances business perspectives in the early stage of system 
architecture works. It helps solve a problem that a system architecture work 
usually begins from a technical perspective, looking at technologies for 
solutions whilst ignoring the business requirements [17].  
 
In the SABSA model, the contextual layer, conceptual layer and logical layer 
optimises the business requirements collection of an application development. 
It also ensures business requirements are aligned with the business strategy.  
 
In forensics overlay, Business/Forensics drivers are abstracted from 
business/forensics objectives. For instance, in strategic level, the senior 
executive team may address that the legal department should collect digital 
evidence in a forensics manner in cases of 1) cyber crimes, 2) highly 
offensive but not unlawful incidents and 3) breaches of procedure, policy or 
inappropriate actions. These objectives can be presented in a workshop 
section to extract business forensics drivers.  
 
The law enforcement‘s forensics objectives are specified in forensics 
standards for forensics tools, technologies and methodologies compliance. 
The most significant objective is that the forensic evidence preservation 
process must meet certain conceptual, logical, technical, and operational 
standards. It follows that businesses must comply with these standards for the 
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evidence accuracy, completeness, authenticity and admissibility [19] and 
ensures that the business system is at all times compliant with the laws and 
industry sector regulations and that the system approach directly and 
indirectly supports legal compliance. 
 
2.1.2 Awareness of Risks 
In SABSA, focusing on environmental influences means dealing with external 
threats and internal vulnerabilities of businesses via risk management. The 
SABSA matrix contains a column of key activities that guides a top-down 
process for risk mitigation. These activities include setting risk management 
objectives, setting risk management policy, setting practical r isk management 
processes and using risk management tools.  
 
In terms of digital forensics for a business, the ultimate goal of a cybercrime 
investigation varies depending on situations, and can be influenced by 
business concerns, cost-benefit analysis, due diligence considerations and 
admissibility in court [20]. After evidential data collection and analysis, the 
concern of taking further legal action depends on the businesses‘ decision. As 
long as the business strategically decides ―forensically sound business 
environment‖ as part of the business objective, the business should raise the 
risk awareness when applying ―forensically sound‖ to the business application 
development. Specifically, during an application development process, the 
major work of risk management team needs to manage the risks that may 
hinder the admissibility of the evidence. Any actions that might impact the 
weight of evidence should be avoided.  
 
In the forensics overlay, the risk mitigation is one of the motivations that 
forensically sound application is developed to protect evidential data. A risk 
list should be addressed in the forensics overlay.  
 
2.1.3 Simplify Complexity 
SABSA decomposes the business (system) into smaller self-contained sub-
systems. This process distributes tasks to various expertises while system 
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architects can ensure that logically related functions are implemented together. 
This allows the sub-systems to be tested separately to confirm compliance 
with its objective. The SABSA matrix breaks down systematic problems by 
system stakeholders‘ roles and responsibilities. With each group of 
stakeholder, the SABSA matrix proposes six questions associated with the 
typical group of stakeholder‘s responsibilities. Such structure is present ed as 
a 6x6 table shown in Table 2-3. This structure is later passed onto the SABSA 
overlay to address the forensics issues. 
 
In terms of creating a forensics overlay based on the SABSA matrix, not all of 
thirty six cells of the matrix are filled. Ideally, all cells in the SABSA matrix 
should be able to find equivalences in the digital forensic area. However, 
without a specified business case, it is irrelevant to address issues such as 
Business Forensics Application Deployment Timetable, or Business IT 
Infrastructure. These blank cells are filled when a specific business starts to 
use the overlay to address forensics issues in its environment.  
 
2.1.4 Measure Performance against Objectives 
In the SABSA‘s top-down approach, business requirements are gathered to 
extract business drivers which are later mapped with related business 
attributes. SABSA provides Business Attributes Profile with a column that 
indicates a Suggested Measurement Approach for each business attributes. 
See Table 2-1 [16]. 
 
Business 
Attributes 
Attribute 
Explanation 
Metric 
Type 
Suggested 
Measurement approach 
Informed The user should be kept 
fully informed about 
services, operating 
procedure, operational 
schedules, planner 
outages, and so on. 
Soft Focus groups or 
satisfaction surveys 
 
Table 2- 1 Sample Business Attributes Measurement Table [16]  
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The business is not the only entity to make these measurements. The law 
enforcement also obliges forensics requirements to businesses. After all, if 
businesses decided to take legal actions, the law enforcement is the only 
party to qualify the admissibility and weight of the evidence generated by a 
forensically sound application.  
 
The overall value of SABSA appears in its business focus, risk management, 
and built-in SABSA features that simplify system complexity and measure the 
business performances against business drivers. 
 
2.2 SABSA Model 
A SABSA model is a top-down approach that drives the SABSA development 
process. This process analyses business requirements at the outset, and 
creates a chain of traceability through the SABSA lifecycle phases of ‗Strategy 
and Planning‘, ‗Design‘, ‗Implement‘ and ongoing ‗Manage and Measure‘, 
shown in Figure 1-5, to ensure that the business mandate is preserved. The 
SABSA model is further abstractly presented as the SABSA matrix which is 
created from practical experience to support the whole methodology [14].  
 
The SABSA model comprises of six layers. Each layer represents the view of 
different roles in building enterprise security architecture similar to the 
construction of a building, shown in Table 2-2. 
 
The Business View Contextual Security Architecture  
The Architecture‘s View  Conceptual Security Architecture 
The Designer ‗s View  Logical Security Architecture 
The Builder‘s View  Physical Security Architecture 
The Tradesman‘s View Component Security Architecture 
The Facility Manager‘s View  Operational Security Architecture 
 
Table 2- 2 SABSA Model: Stakeholders’ Views [14]  
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To present the SABSA model in matrix, horizontally, SABSA matrix uses six 
questions ―What, Why, How, Who, Where and When‖ to analyse six layers in 
detail, shown in Table 2-3. 
 
 what why how who  where when 
Contextual        
Conceptual        
Logical        
Physical        
Component        
Operational        
 
Table 2- 3 SABSA Matrix Structure 
 
2.2.1 Contextual Security Architecture 
One of the creative concepts of SABSA is to consider business strategy as an 
enabler for information security. Before an architect starts working, a business 
owner has to specify the business objectives which are used to extract 
business drivers. These processes can be done via interview or workshop, 
where the questions such as ―What type of information system is it? Why use 
it? How? Who uses it and When?‖ are asked and answered. Understanding 
the business view helps to build the contextual security architecture. 
Contextual Security Architecture is a description of the business context in 
which the secure system must be designed, built and later operated. It not 
only solves the problem that ―Technologists are traditionally not good at 
listening to the business owners and users‖, but also solves the problem that 
―the business tends to consider information security is a pure technical 
problem‖ [16]. 
 
In terms of forensics overlay, the contextual layer needs to guide the business 
decision maker to think forensically. That means the six questions should be 
asked with forensics considerations. For example: What is the business 
attempt to achieve by designing forensics features in their information system? 
Why does the business need that? How does the forensically sound 
information system benefit the business process? Who (or which department 
team) are going to ensure the forensically sound business? 
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Another concern of forensics contextual layer is that businesses and law 
authorities are both high level stakeholders. Therefore, the business needs to 
consider forensics regulations and standards on a strategic level. That means 
in a cybercrime event, the business needs to enhance the ability of evidence 
collection, preservation, analysis and presentation according to strategic 
decisions. 
 
In a forensics contextual layer (see details in Chapter 4), technical issues 
such as the application development are not yet addressed since an 
application is a part of the business system that is considered on a physical 
level. However, a business guided by the forensics contextual layer should 
consider allocating the resources and present clear requirements for a 
forensically sound system development. 
 
2.2.2 Conceptual Security Architecture 
The conceptual security architecture reflects architects‘ view of the enterprise 
security. It is where system architects blueprint the overall concept by which 
the business requirements of the enterprise may be met. It defines from 
higher level what kind of work needs to be done in the next layers, by 
engineers with specific expertise.  
 
Similar to contextual security architecture, there are six questions applied to 
define: What need to be done according to the SABSA provided Business 
Attributes Profile (What); Provide the control objectives as the motivation for 
security (Why); Provide the major security strategies (How); Security entities 
and their trust relationship (Who); Where is the security domain and time 
dependence of security (When).  
 
The key feature in contextual layer is the Taxonomy of Standard Business 
Attributes (SBAs), shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2- 1 SABSA Standard Business Attributes (SBAs) 
 
The SBAs are the common types of high level business drivers and are seen 
again and again in different organisations, even in different industrial sectors. 
The Taxonomy is extensive which means it is encouraged to add and define 
new business attributes according to the specific business requirements such 
as corporate forensics requirements [14].  
 
To create conceptual architecture for the forensics overlay, the most important 
task is to create forensics relevant Business Attributes Profile. The task 
involves selecting forensics relevant attributes from SBAs and adding new 
attributes when necessary. The relative supporting information such as 
suggested measurement approaches mapping to business attributes are 
documented during the process. 
 
The process is conducted by the workshops to decide which attributes are 
relevant to business/forensics requirements. According to business/forensics 
requirements that are defined in the contextual layer, some of the selected 
attributes need to be redefined to serve a forensics purpose. The following 
processes abstract the forensics attributes: 
 
 Extract Business/Forensics Drivers from collected Business/Forensics 
requirements; 
 Select or add new forensics attributes from Standard Business 
Attributes according to Business/Forensics Drivers;  
Accessible
Accurate
Anonymous
Consistent
Duty Segregated
Educated & Aware
Informed
Motivated
Protected
Reliable
Responsive
Transparent
Supported
Timely
Usable 
Automated
Change-Managed
Continuous
Controlled
Cost-Effective
Efficient
Maintainable
Measured
Monitored
Supportable
Available
Detectable
Error-free
Interoperable
Productive
Recoverable 
Access-controlled
Accountable
Assurable
Assuring Honesty
Auditable
Authenticated
Authorised
Capturing New Risks
Confidential 
Crime-free
Flexibly Secure
Identified
Independently Secure
In Sole Possession
Integrity Assured
Non-Repuditable
Owned
Private
Trustworthy
Admissible
Compliant 
Enforcement
Insurable
Legal 
Liability Managed
Regulated
Resolvable
Time-Bound
Architecturally Open
COTS/GOTS
Extendable
Flexible-Adaptable
Future Proof
Legacy-Sensitive
Migratable
Multi-Sourced
Scalable
Simple
Standards Compliant
Traceable
Upgradable
Brand Enhancing
Business Enabled
Competent
Confident
Credible
Governable
Providing Good Stewardship 
and Custody
Providing Investment Reuse
Providing Return on 
Investment
Reputable
User Attributes Management Attributes Operational Attributes 
Risk Management 
Attributes 
Legal/Regulatory 
Attributes
Technical Strategy 
Attributes
Business Strategy 
Attributes
Standard Business Attributes
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 Define selected or newly added attributes forensically.  
 
Finishing the above processes helps narrow down the business attribute 
profile into a forensics specified attribute profile. This provides an abstract 
view of business/forensics requirements and can be traced back to contextual 
layer to map the addressed business/forensics requirements. 
 
2.2.3 Logical Security Architecture 
In the SABSA model, logical security architecture reflects the designer‘s view 
of the business in terms of a secure system. In this layer, the business 
information that requires protection is logically presented in form of a business 
policy and service. High-level security policies and logical domain policies are 
specified in order to guide the logical security service. The logical securi ty 
service category provides a picture of overall sub-security systems in a logical 
level. Later on, the logical security service guides physical security architects 
to specify the security mechanism in physical architecture. For example, if the 
designers list Integrity Protection as one of the logical security services, then it 
should have a related security mechanism such as digital signature in the 
physical layer.  
 
In the overlay, the information collected from the forensics contextual and 
conceptual layer helps define what ―business information (NOT Business 
Data)‖ need to be protected in a forensics manner during the usage of typical 
applications. Relevant policies are created accordingly from both business 
and forensics perspectives to protect the information. Also, forensics services 
that need to be built into business applications are defined in this layer. For 
example, this layer may establish a typical business policy to protect Email 
information exchanged between business email client user and outside of the 
business. According to such a policy, the next layer defines Email data, and 
guides the email client development. 
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2.2.4 Physical Security Architecture 
The physical security architecture has a strong technical focus; because this 
is the layer that a system builder chooses and assembles the physical 
elements that make the logical design come to life. Tracing back to the logical 
security architecture, logical security services are delivered in physical forms. 
Different from the logical security architecture that focus on ―information‖, the 
asset that needs to be protected in physical architecture is ―data‖. Developers 
(Builders) specify the business data model and the security related data 
structure (tables, messages, pointers, certificates, signatures, etc.). 
 
In terms of the forensics overlay, the evidential data in different sub-system 
requires protection. The business should have a set of practical rules for each 
sub-system to protect the potential digital evidence. Practical rules to protect  
data are derived from the forensics policy that has been decided in the 
previous layer. Also, forensically sound applications should be developed 
according to forensics services that have been decided in the previous layer. 
Such tractability, shown in Figure 2-2, between layers can be seen often in 
the forensics overlay. 
 
 
Forensics
Policies. E.g. 
Protect Email 
Information 
forensically
Forensics 
Services. E.g. 
Forensics Email 
Archiving 
Forensics Rules 
for subsystem 
data protection. 
E.g. All Sent-Email 
Content Data will 
be saved 
forensically
Forensics 
Mechanisms for 
subsystem data 
protection. E.g. 
Sent-Email Data 
will be recorded 
and Saved in XML 
form and hashed.
Logical Layer
Physical Layer
 
 
Figure 2- 2 Traceability Sample between Logical and Physical Layer  
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In the forensics physical layer, digital evidence integrity protection is highly 
prioritised since forensics overlay considers all data as potential evidence and 
requires protective mechanisms (e.g. Hash). Therefore, the forensics physical 
layer needs to be applied in an application development in order to generate 
the forensics mechanism. 
 
Another concern about the forensics physical layer is that a forensically sound 
application usually has two contrast user (USERs) groups: offenders (OFs) 
who misuse the application intentionally or unintentionally; and forensics 
investigators (FIs) who investigate misuse cases by utilising the built-in 
forensics features, shown in Figure 2-3. Therefore, designing and developing 
authentication mechanisms are used to distinguish these different roles and 
are critical since forensics features require exclusive access only by FIs. 
 
 
 
Figure 2- 3 Forensically Sound Application Users 
 
2.2.5 Component Security Architecture 
The component layer focuses on third party software and hardware tools, 
business partners, etc. In the concept of forensically sound software 
development, we attempt to reduce the overreliance of forensics tools. 
Therefore, we have no specific requirements on this layer. 
 
  
OFs ⊂ USERs
&
FIs ⊂ USERS
All Application 
Users (USERs)
Offenders 
(OFs)
Forensics 
Investigators
(FIs)
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2.2.6 Operational Security Architecture 
The operational layer reflects facility-manager‘s view, which focuses on 
maintaining the security of business systems in an operational level. The 
operational layer further addresses the issues of using business applications 
according to the security policies that relate to confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, auditability and accountability. In terms of security, this layer 
involves the proper usage of security products to protect the daily business. 
 
In terms of forensics overlay, the operational layer addresses the proper 
usage of forensically sound applications rather than forensics tools. Ideally, 
the forensically sound application has features that are sufficient for a 
forensics investigation. Therefore, in an operational level, the issue needed to 
be addressed is a chain of custody, which focuses on evidence preservation 
in operational level. 
 
2.3 Why Use SABSA? 
Two major reasons that SABSA overcomes other current forensics models 
are 1) comprehensive view on entire business/forensics environment rather 
than the narrow focus on Technical and Operational perspectives; 2) SABSA 
has an interface (contextual layer) to absorb the business requirements in the 
first place rather than provides ―checklist liken‖ one for all solution.  
2.3.1 Other Forensics Models 
A complex cyber-forensics project requires the expertise go beyond pure 
technical perspective, most of current forensics models still focus on providing 
technical and operational solutions. 
 
Models that Focus on Technical Forensics 
Using a technical forensics model in an enterprise environment usually leads 
to overreliance on both vendor-based forensics tools and assistance from 
external forensics technical support. The tools and external supports are 
critical on one hand. They are insufficient in the current enterprise forensics 
situations, especially in case of a network/enterprise environment where the 
life forensics, real time monitoring and evidence colleting are needed.  
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Windows Vista Forensics Framework [20] is created to take advantage of new 
vista forensics features such as ―Bitlocker, Encrypting File system (EFS), 
Backup and Restore‖ to extract data that have potential evidence value in 
windows vista system. The framework is more like a technical guide for 
forensics experts who deal with a single PC installed with the Vista system. 
The research successfully explained the challenges of new (year of 2008) 
vista system to computer forensics investigators and provided a practical 
solution for them.  
 
However, the framework focuses on utilising the existing Vista features but 
neglects the consideration of: How these vista forensics features are high 
level designed to be efficient to assist the forensics process; what the 
forensics and business requirements are used in designing such features; 
How these forensics and business requirements are integrated into a software 
development process. Similar issues found in the researches of Mac OS X 
operating system forensics [21]; Windows physical memory forensics method 
[22] and physical memory forensics framework [23].  
 
Models that Focus on Operational Forensics 
Other researches focus on operational digital forensics perspective which is 
the process of Identification - Acquisition - Preservation - Examination - 
Analysis - Reporting lifecycle [25]. Some forensics models focus on one 
phase of forensics lifecycle. Such models neglect the fact that the forensics 
lifecycle is part of the enterprise digital investigation lifecycle. Using such 
models in an enterprise digital investigation, business related phases need to 
be added to ensure the business procedure. Sean, P., B. Matt, et al. (2007) 
[24] presented an overview of a forensics model for an evidence analysis 
phase. Even though this research attempted to reduce the focuses on 
technical aspects (avoid issues from technical models), it merely provides the 
policies and procedures during a formal forensics operation. These policies 
may ignore the high level business objectives and lower level business 
system requirements. 
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Another issue with operational models is that they may be out of date for 
current enterprise environments. The common features of forensics operation 
models are based on conventional forensics lifecycle which has been 
unchanged for decades. However, the landscape of a forensics lifecycle has 
begun to change, especially under the circumstance of cyber  warfare and 
cloud computing.  
 
2.3.2 Advantages of SABSA Model 
In this section, we introduce advantages of the SABSA model. These 
advantages are managed to pass onto the forensics overlay, which makes the 
forensics overlay a new model that outgoes the previous deficiencies.  
 
Firstly, the SABSA model provides a comprehensive view of the forensics 
issues. It contains six layers which represent various stakeholders‘ view of the 
system. This overcomes the problem that current forensics models have 
narrow focus on technical or operational issues and lack of strategically 
design of a forensic solution. Hence, using forensics overlay in a business 
helps integrate all business department efforts to devote into any forensics 
projects such as conducting forensics investigations, developing forensics 
tools, developing forensically sound software, developing business forensics 
plans, etc. 
 
Secondly, recent forensics models are static, which means these models only 
provide informative guidance for forensics activities. These models simply 
organise forensics regulations and present them in form of charts, field guide, 
policy, checklist, cheat sheet, etc. Such phenomena results in a typical 
mistake that in many companies, a large portion of the forensics budget is 
allocated to compliance testing for industrial standards.  In this case, the 
senior executives only assign the compliance department to deal with the 
seasonal compliance examination rather than be part of the business 
forensics strategy decision making.  
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The SABSA model on the other hand, has a lifecycle, which means there is 
an interface to intake the users‘ requirements, and be able to produce and 
measure the outcome of the physical solution, shown in Figure 2-3. In this 
case, the senior executives are able to enhance the influence via the input of 
high level requirements. This ensures the forensics/business requirements 
are from both regulation authorities and businesses. 
 
 
Figure 2- 4 Differences between Current Forensics Model and SABSA 
Model 
 
Thirdly, due to the traceability between six layers, layers are not isolated from 
each other so that different system development roles work as a team. The 
SABSA traceability shows a clear development track that starts with high level 
business requirements and ends with the technical solutions. There are more 
details in Chapter 6 about how the SABSA traceability helps develop each 
forensics mechanism for an email client. 
 
Fourthly, SABSA has existing features to help forensically address each ce ll. 
For example, in conceptual asset cell, forensics architects should create a set 
of forensics attributes that are extracted from forensics standards. It is not 
practical since attributes are highly conceptual concentrated terms. However, 
SABSA conveniently provides Standard Business Attributes. The forensics 
architects only need to select and define attributes in a forensics sense. Table 
2-4 indicated how differently the SABSA Model and Forensics Overlay defined 
the attribute of ―Informed‖. 
This is what you 
are going to do: 
checklist1,2,3...
Current Forensics Model
Layered, 
comprehensive
Forensics 
Analysis Features
Forensics Overlay derived from 
SABSA Model 
Your Decision: 
What do you want 
to achieve
Tasks Motivations Methods Roles Locations Time
Different stakeholders views
Input
OutcomeMeasurement
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Table 2- 4 Business and Forensics Definition of the Term “Inform”  
 
2.4 Previous Work 
SABSA provides an ideal framework for integrating many traditional standards 
and processes from various aspects. SABSA was used to incorporate with 
Survivable Network Assessment (SNA)/Risk Analysis & Probabilistic 
Survivability Assessment (RAPSA) and other existing approaches to deliver a 
coherent methodology for designing next generation networks with a 
business-driven level of survivability [26]. Figure 2-4 shows the process to 
create a SABSA survivability overlay. The overlay takes the form of an 
additional set of activities in a number of the SABSA matrix cells, which when 
populated can be added to the standard SABSA assessment to provide a 
complementary survivability view of the enterprise‘s essential services.  
 
 
 
Figure 2- 5 SNA/RAPSA Integrated with SABSA Framework 
 
In our project forensics knowledge and business forensics requirements are 
incorporated into the SABSA framework to deliver a forensics overlay, shown 
in Figure 2-5. 
 
SABSA 
Analysis
SNA/RAPSA etc.
When
Service Management
Component
Physical
Logical
Conceptual
Contextual
WhereHowWhyWhat
SABSA View of Next Generation Networks Survivability 
Input output
When
Service Management
Component
Physical
Logical
Conceptual
Contextual
WhereHowWhyWhat
SABSA View of Next Generation Networks Survivability 
SABSA Defined “Informed” [17] Forensics Overlay defined “Informed” 
The user should be kept fully 
informed about service, operating 
procedures, operational 
schedules, planned outage, and 
so on.  
Forensics procedure briefing information 
should be documented, or DEFR should 
be informed to do so. 
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The Computer Forensics process requires a higher level of expertises beyond 
IT personals capabilities and knowledge. Improper and lack of IT staff training 
with formalised computer forensics methodologies may cause artefacts of 
potential evidentiary value to lose their overall admissibility in court or, worse 
yet, evidence may be destroyed altogether. In figure 2-6, forensics knowledge 
is one important input. SABSA is the foundation framework or analysis 
method. A SABSA forensics overlay is the outcome. 
 
 
 
Figure 2- 6 Forensics Element Integrated with SABSA Framework 
 
2.5 A New Model – The Forensics Overlay Based on SABSA 
To sum up, increasing digital forensics activities are moving into a 
network/enterprise environment and existing in forms of the network and 
systems baseline monitoring, logs analysing, hidden and/or inappropriate files 
scanning, password auditing, malware investigation, incident response and 
forensic toolkits creating, key loggers installing/configuring and Law 
enforcement liaison [27]. The current models that deal with typical system 
data acquisitions, forensics tools and forensics operations are not 
comprehensive enough for current environments. A new model is needed to 
deal with forensics issues from the business perspective. The link between 
―operational, technical forensics factors‖ and ―corporate infrastructure, 
enterprise content‖ needs to be addressed in this model. On the other hand, 
legal factors that represent the law enforcement‘s requirements also need to 
be integrated into this new model. This is further explained in Chapter 3.  
 
SABSA 
Analysis
Forensic Knowledge
When
Service Management
Component
Physical
Logical
Conceptual
Contextual
WhereHowWhyWhat
SABSA View of Next Generation Networks Survivability 
Input output
When
Service Management
Component
Physical
Logical
Conceptual
Contextual
WhereHowWhyWhat
SABSA View of Forensic
(Forensics Overlay)
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SABSA deals with enterprise security issues from contextual, conceptual, 
logical, technical and operational perspectives. Based on SABSA, the overlay 
should cover forensics issues in all these perspectives. Additionally, the legal 
considerations are needed in the overall forensics overlay, shown in Figure 2-
7. These legal considerations are the forensics standards, legal precedents, 
laws and regulations that can be used to extract law enforcement‘s 
requirements which are explained in chapter 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2- 7 Forensics Overlay for Enterprise Forensics Program/Project 
Development 
 
For a business that plans to establish the digital forensics capability, the 
overlay can be used to: 
 
 Identify the digital investigative capability requirements which include 
forensics goals, costs, resources, timelines, and outsources. 
 Provide digital investigative capability administrative considerations, 
which include forensics policies and forensics investigation procedures. 
 Allocate resources such as forensics tools, external teams that suit the 
business forensics environment. 
 Guide the internal business system or application development in 
forensics manner. 
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2.5.1 Differences between the Forensics Overlay and the SABSA Matrix 
On one hand the overlay is created to solve forensics issues in a corporate 
environment. On the other hand, the overlay is a superstructure of the SABSA 
matrix. In sections 2.3.2, the overlay has been introduced as it has the same 
properties as the SABSA model. However, they have differences in terms of 
scope, function, content, etc. 
 
Firstly, the forensics overlay is a ―size down‖ version of the SABSA model. 
The structure of the overlay is similar to but derived from the SABSA model. 
Not all cells in the SABSA model are filled to create the overlay and with the 
filled cell, it only addresses forensics issues. 
 
 
 
Figure 2- 8 Differences between the Forensics Overlay and the SABSA 
Matrix 
 
Secondly, considering the function, the SABSA matrix deals with enterprise 
security issues while the overlay deals with enterprise forensics issues. The 
further research shows that the SABSA security model has slightly overlapped 
the forensics issues especially in legal part. This overlap can be observed 
from Taxonomy of Standard Business Attributes (SBAs) (Figure 2-1). The fifth 
The SABSA Matrix
Contains six horizontal layers of abstraction of 
architecture model: contextual, conceptual, logical, 
physical, component and operational. Each of the 
sections has also introduced a series of vertical cuts 
through each of these horizontal layers, answering 
the questions of ―What, why, how, who, where, 
when‖  
The Forensics Overlay 
Same structure as SABSA model, but 
cconsidering the each cell of the SABSA 
design matrix in terms of forensics 
requirements. It is a narrow-down and 
specific version of SABSA matrix 
Business Digital Forensics 
Capability Solutions 
Guided by Forensics Overlay, the 
business can develop their internal 
forensics programs, or handle forensics 
related project such as Forensically 
sound Email Client Development  
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column of SBAs shows a category of Legal/Regulatory Attributes which 
already contains some forensics attributes. 
 
Thirdly, considering the knowledge background, the contents in the overlay 
are extracted from forensics knowledge such as standards, legal precedents, 
rules of evidences, etc. The SABSA matrix is based on enterprise security 
knowledge. In the SABSA model, the 36 cells are all addressed with security 
concerns, while in overlay, some of the cells are left blank since addressing 
this cell may confuse the users and affect overlay‘s forensics emphasis.  
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3 Forensics Industry Evolution and Forensics Knowledge 
In chapter one, issues found in current forensics models were analysed and 
proposed to build a forensics overlay where the ―corporate infrastructure & 
enterprise content‖ is addressed. At the end of chapter one, we proposed that 
forensics requirements should be integrated in all layers of the overlay, shown 
in Figure 2-7. Forensics requirements are extracted from current forensics 
knowledge, mostly from forensics standards. In this chapter, we describe the 
evolution of cybercrime, digital forensics and how forensics knowledge is 
standardised during the digital forensics professionalisation. Furthermore, we 
explain how the current digital forensics crisis affects our extraction of 
forensics requirements from current forensics standards. At the end of 
Chapter 3, we review chapter one and two and provide a blueprint to 
construct the forensics overlay. 
 
Chapter Three: 
3.1 Explains the Evolution of Cybercrime and Digital Forensics 
3.2 Introduces Forensics Knowledge 
3.3 Introduces the Selected Forensics Standards 
3.4 Sumarises the Knowledge Structure of the Forensics Overlay 
 
3.1 Evolution of Cybercrime and Digital Forensics Investigation 
The term ―cybercrime‖ has only been used in recent years. This chapter refers 
to computer, system and network related crimes since the earliest cyber age. 
The term ―digital forensics‖ has been mentioned for the last ten years. 
According to many researchers, digital forensics has been through the early 
days, the golden age, and the crisis time. This section explains how 
cybercrime and the digital forensics industry evolved with ―spring up‖ 
technologies in different ages. In understanding the evolution, we explain how 
forensics knowledge is developed and standardised. Furthermore, study of 
the digital forensics crisis points out ―forensics standards‖ as the primary 
component among the overall forensics knowledge. 
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3.1.1 The Early Days 
The first hacking activities can be dated back to early 1960s when 
programming enthusiasts group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) programmed for the sheer joy of their first system – Program Data 
Processor (PDP) One [28]. Even though the term ―hacker‖ is being 
intermingled with the term ―cyber criminals‖ by public, in the digital world, the 
term ―hacker‖ is defined as ―A person who delights in having an intimate 
understanding of the internal workings of a system, computers and computer 
networks in particular‖ [29]. In early ages, a cybercrime that harms individuals 
was impossible because there was no personal computer. The mainframes 
were owned by cooperates or the government. There were no major arrests of 
cyber criminals around the 1960s, except a few cases of embezzlement, 
inflating company earnings, stealing trade secrets, misappropriating company 
data [30]. 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, major cybercrimes are associated with 
breaking into the telecommunication system and take advantage of it, for 
example, ―hack‖ and making long distance calls without the payment. The 
term ―Phreaker‖ is used to describe a cyber criminal who conducts such 
activity. There were a few arrests during this period. John Draper designed 
the original blue box which could produce the 2600 Hz signal that granted 
access to AT&T‘s long distance services. He was arrested and served time in 
a California minimum security prison for this infraction [28].  
 
The 1970s is considered as the beginning of the computer era. The cyber 
technology had some breakthroughs such as the emergence of first affordable 
personal computer, early computer network, popularity of bulletin board 
system (BBS), etc. During this decade, illegal cyber activities started with 
using BBS to upload illegal material or harassed other users; however, these 
infractions are rarely thwarted by law enforcement but by BBS system 
administrators [28]. In the late 1970s, the term ―hacker‖ was intermingled with 
the term ―cracker‖ by the public and since then crackers have been using 
digital tools to take advantage of other computer users. 
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In the 1980s, the worldwide network was steadily growing. By 1989, all 
sources agreed that there were more than 100,000 hosts on the network. In 
the 1980s, the FBI made some of the first high-profile arrests of computer 
crackers [28].  
 
The 1980s is referred as early stage of cybercrime and digital forensics 
(neither terms had been used in this stage). During this time, there was limited 
needs of digital forensics and few cases required analysis of digital media 
because there were less volume of digital media for the potential digital 
evidence, cybercrime investigators could find more evidence from other media 
such as printouts.  
 
The 1960s to end of 1980s is the early days of cybercrime and digital 
forensics. Pollitt, M. (2010) referred these early days as ―The Pre-history‖ of 
digital forensics [30], which means it was the least documented time in the 
digital forensics history. Garfinkel, S. L. (2010) marked this period by its poor 
documentation, heavily reliance on time-sharing and centralised computing 
facilities, rarely was there significant storage in the home of either users or 
perpetrators that required analysis and the absence of formal process, tools, 
and training [31]. There were no actual forensics standards. Since the early 
forensics professionals were mostly from law enforcement, they would work or 
be trained in cooperation with systems administrators [30]. Their knowledge 
was mostly based on the computer systems of that time. 
 
3.1.2 The Golden Age 
In the 1990s, the emergence of new technologies such as broadband Internet 
connectivity, wireless network, sophisticated web and email techniques, 
mobile computing, e-commerce and online banking, new operating system 
and new applications have created new vulnerabilities for crackers. On the 
other hand, the commercialisation of the Internet enhanced the popularity of 
these technologies as well as various online services. It follows that the scope 
of cybercrime is extended. Cybercrime evolved into two categories, shown in 
Figure 3-1. Firstly, crimes that must be committed through computers or 
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network system such as malicious code, system backdoor and network 
intrusion. Secondly, crimes that only finds computer as a convenient tool such 
as enterprise frauds, scams, and white-collar crimes. 
 
 
 
Figure 3- 1 Cybercrime Categories 
 
Garfinkel, S. L. (2010) believes that from 1999 to 2007 is the digital forensics 
golden age [31]. With both categories of cybercrimes (Figure 3-1) emerging in 
business environments, businesses started to notice the importance of digital 
forensics. Forensics investigators steadily appeared in both business and law 
enforcement groups. Their duties in this time focused on recovering data from 
all sorts of digital media in a stand-alone computer, analysing aquisited data, 
and presenting analysis results as potential evidence to the court of law if 
further legal actions were pursuit. 
 
Fostered by technological developments and urged by increasing cybercrimes, 
the digital forensics industry accelerated its standardisation and 
professionalisation. The forensics golden age was characterised by the 
widespread use of Microsoft Windows, and specifically Windows XP; relatively 
few file formats of forensic interest - mostly Microsoft Office for documents, 
JPEG for digital photographs and AVI and WMV for video; examinations 
largely confined to a single computer system belonging to the subject of the 
investigation; storage devices equipped with standard interfaces (IDE/ ATA), 
attached using removable cables and connectors, and secured with 
removable screws; multiple vendors selling tools that were reasonably good at 
recovering allocated and deleted files; and a rapid growth in digital forensics 
research [31].  
Cybercrime
New crimes that 
have to associated 
with computer or 
network systems.
E.g. Malicious code 
Injection
Traditional crimes 
that use computer 
or network systems 
as new crime tools
E.g. Scams using 
Internet 
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Professionalisation and Standardisation  
In the ―golden age‖, the digital forensics industries were steadily formed due 
to the increasing need of tools, models and knowledge collected from digital 
forensics researches. The digital forensics professionalisation had adopted a 
―routine procedure‖ for investigators to conduct the forensics investigation. 
From time to time, this ―routine procedure‖ has been applied and developed 
by investigators, verified by law enforcement, studied and analysed by 
forensics researchers.  
 
These sets of routines are referred as the conventional forensics investigation 
lifecycle (CFL). Practically all forensics standards or studies in that time 
followed the CFL or phase(s) of CFL, shown in Table 3-2. The key 
components of CFL in order are: Identification, Preparation, Approach 
Strategy, Preservation, Acquisition, Examination, Analysis, Presentation and 
Returning Evidence [32], shown in Figure 3-2.  
 
 
Figure 3- 2 Conventional Forensics Lifecycle 
 
The CFL are based on the procedure of static forensics (data recovery from 
static data storages), lessons from legal precedents and Forensics Studies 
and Researches. To perform each stage in CFL, the forensics industry 
developed diverse forensics standards, the development approaches are 
introduced in [62]. These standards collect forensics requirements in technical, 
operational and legal perspectives, shown in Figure 3-3. These standards are 
created via formal and authorised organisation such as National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). 
Identification Preparation Approach Strategy Preservation Acquisition
Returning Evidence Presentation Analysis Examination
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Figure 3- 3 Digital Forensics Standardisation 
 
These standards are widely adopted by businesses that are willing to comply 
with the lawful regulations. For example, some businesses are required to 
have an adequate auditing process to ensure the compliance with forensics 
standards. Therefore, forensics standards are the most dominant in the 
industry among all categories of forensics knowledge.  
 
In recent years forensics standards has not been able to keep up with the 
proliferating new technologies and cybercrimes since operational and 
technical standards are easily challenged and are forced to make alterations 
for many cases. On the other hand, legal forensics standards appear more 
immutable than technological and operational standards. It follows that legal 
elements such as ―lessons from legal precedent, rules of evidence, rules of 
forensics operation, and chain of custody etc‖ are focused more in many 
researches. Our research focuses on determining the business and legal 
requirements from forensics standards, for collecting evidence and designing 
mechanisms to collect evidence.  
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3.1.3 The Current Crisis of Digital Forensics 
In recent years, digital forensics has faced a crisis due to several emerging 
technologies. The challenges are from four areas 1) technologies forming a 
complex business environment in which potential evidence are more fragile 
and hard to collect and preserve; 2) adopting diverse technologies could 
mean accept more system vulnerability and business risk; 3) adopting diverse 
technologies makes it challenging to unify and standardise forensics activities 
and 4) new techniques also nourish the cybercrime incidence, details are 
explained with the following examples. 
 
Digital Storage Related Technologies 
The increasing data storage makes it impractical for investigators to perform a 
bit-by-bit copy of the entire data storage unit. The diversity of data storage 
(flash drivers, solid state drives, RAMs in all computer components) and data 
storage interface standards hinder the usage of one standardised forensics 
tool. Furthermore, the increasing data security awareness leads to the usage 
of data encryption. In addition, forensics activities are constrained since data 
privacy is protected by laws and regulations.  
 
Pervasive Networks  
The forensics target is not a stand-alone computer but a complex system that 
require analysis of multiple targets which may not geographically reside in one 
location. Cybercrimes are conducted with more complex tools; larger 
geographic domain; involve more data, etc. Moreover, virtualisation 
technology and cloud computing concepts are facilitated by pervasive 
networks, which lead user data to move to remote and discontinuous storage. 
 
New forms of cybercrimes emerged in terms of hacktivism, cyber terrorism, 
cyber warfare, etc. The increasing diversity of cybercrimes raise more 
challenges to forensics investigation. Therefore, forensics industries require 
new strategy, methodology and tool for this rapid turnaround.  
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Diverse Operating System 
The proliferation of diverse operating systems (OS) makes it challenging to 
unify and standardise forensics activities for investigating computers and 
other devices. For example, when the forensics targets OS is no longer as 
familiar as Windows, the digital investigator has to use different tools, 
procedures, and standards to deal with new OS. The aim of the investigator is 
to answer the questions of ―What incriminating information is present in the 
system?‖ and ―How did the incriminating information get there?‖ The answers 
depend in all cases on how the information of interest is stored by the 
operating system (i.e. the internal structure), and the analysis tools the 
operating system provides (i.e. the functionality) [66]. However, with different 
OSs, the answers are varied.  
 
In some other cases, forensics operations have no standards to follow. For 
example, the proliferation of mobile operating system results in forensics 
investigators seeking to conduct mobile forensics under a common standard, 
which however, have not yet been formed. According to the NIST Guidelines 
on Cell Phone Forensics, when confronting a cell phone that is password-
protected, forensics investigators are recommended to search Internet sites 
for developers, hackers, and security exploit information [31]. 
 
Over-Anticipation of Forensics Tool Development 
Most forensics researchers believe a straightforward solution is to create a 
new operational model and develop more sophisticated forensics software. In 
2006, Golden G. Richard, I. and V. Roussev (2006) foresaw the crisis and 
suggested that the ―smart acquisition tool‖ should be able to cope with the 
larger storage problem by using built-in data reduction features to select the 
interesting data [33]. Garfinkel, S. L. (2010) suggested the new research 
direction for future forensics is to unify the forensics data image format as well 
as standardised the architecture for forensics software development, create 
alternative analysis models for data abstraction, etc. He concludes that the 
only solution to solve the storage volume problem is to ―create more powerful 
abstractions that allows for the easier manipulation of data and the 
composition of forensics processing elements‖ [31].  
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Forensics tool vendors also foresaw this crisis and endeavoured to improve 
the quality of the tools based on the industrial requirements. For instance, 
EnCase has EnCase Enterprise (EE) and Field Intelligence Model (FIM) live 
investigation functions for a network/enterprise environment, because they 
believe ―as live forensics becomes more necessary and mainstream, their 
value are increasingly accepted by the industry and the judiciary‖ [35].  
 
However, given that ―Smart and powerful acquisition tools‖ is a direct solution, 
the feasibility of such solution is still uncertain. Garfinkel, S. L. (2010) pointed 
out that the current dominant forensics tool vendors are relatively small but 
facing extraordinarily high research and development costs. Product lifetimes 
are short because new developments in the marketplace must be tracked and 
integrated into tools, or else the tools become rapidly obsolete. A few 
commercial players heroically struggle to keep their products up-to-date, but 
their coverage of the digital systems in use today is necessarily incomplete 
[31].  
 
The dynamic status of the overall forensics environment (dynamic forensics 
targets, tools, procedure, etc) leads researchers to look for immutable (or less 
dynamic) elements from the current forensics knowledge. 
 
3.2 Forensics Knowledge 
Forensics knowledge was well developed and standardised in the golden age. 
Meanwhile, the digital forensics industry developed via the compliance with 
standardised forensics knowledge. Forensics knowledge is a collection of 
laws, industrial standards, current forensics literatures, lessons from legal 
cases, etc. Current forensics knowledge guides the industry in four major 
areas.  
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Firstly, in the operational area, forensics knowledge guides forensics experts 
to strictly follow the proper procedure of collecting digital data and presenting 
the data to court as evidence. For example it is the standard that forensics 
investigators shut down a stand-alone PC accordingly in a ―pulling power 
cable‖ forensics manner rather than shut down a machine in the regular way.  
 
Secondly, in the technical area, forensics knowledge guides the development 
of forensics tools. The features in forensics tools are designed and developed 
in a forensics manner. For example, a forensics tool must provide the data 
acquisition function through a bit-by-bit copying feature rather than regular 
copying. In this case, forensics knowledge is the software development 
requirement. 
 
Thirdly, in the business area, forensics knowledge is organised as a field 
guide, regulation, policy, etc. These guidelines help businesses obtain and 
maintain current digital forensics capabilities. 
 
Fourthly, in the legal area, forensics knowledge is integrated with current laws 
and regulations. In this case, the forensics knowledge includes lessons from 
legal precedent, rules of evidence, rules of forensics operations, chain of 
custody, etc. 
 
Our study analyses these four areas in the forensics knowledge. As a result, 
the operational and technical areas of forensics knowledge are more 
vulnerable to dynamic technologies, shown in Table 3-1. That explains the 
constant need of updating current forensics tools. With this endless cycle of 
such escalation, it is challenging for authorised organisations to standardise 
the forensics knowledge. Therefore, forensics knowledge in technical and 
operational areas ―does not guarantee the legal admissibility of electronic 
records – it is a statement of best practice… organisations are encouraged to 
seek both legal and other expert advices…‖ [29].  
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Table 3- 1 Forensics Knowledge and Forensic Challenges 
 
On the other hand, the forensics knowledge in the business and legal area 
tend to stay immutable. Especially in legal area, the standardised rules of 
evidence are more dominated than other standards. For example, when email 
data are collected from different email clients, the data formats are different. 
However, the legal requirements for digital evidence are still Admissible, 
Authentic, Complete, Reliable and Believable. It concludes that when 
integrating the standards to the SABSA matrix to build the overlay, the legal 
and business forensics standards (especially rules of evidence) need to be 
focused, details of forensics standard selection is further explained in next 
section. 
 
3.3 Selection of Forensics Standards 
To create the forensics overlay, the SABSA matrix helps to address the link 
between ―operational, technical forensics factors‖ and ―corporate 
infrastructure, enterprise content‖, while forensics standards help address the 
legal rules. 
 
To extract the legal rules of forensics, a group of forensics standards, shown 
in Table 3-2, is selected across six organisations (NIJ, NIST, ACPO, IOCE, 
ISO and Australia Standards) and three countries (the States, Germany and 
Australia). Those standards were created from 2001 to 2010. Studying these 
Forensics Knowledge  Forensics Challenges 
Operational area increase of data media volume, the diversity of data 
storage, the proliferation of operating system, cloud 
computing 
Technical area increase of data media volume, the diversity of data 
storage, the proliferation of operating system, 
encryption, cloud computing, complexity of tool 
development 
Business area cloud computing 
Legal area cloud computing  
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standards helps us to spot the rules of evidence that have steadily existed for 
the past decade.  
 
 
Learnings from Forensics Standards  
Firstly, we learn about the general forensics environment of a typical year 
when the forensics standard was created. For example, Electronic Crime 
Scene Investigation: A guide for First Responders 1st Edition, shows that in 
year 2001, computers are not frequently used to conduct crime as nowadays 
and also less evidence can be found within the storage due to the limited size.  
 
Secondly, analysing forensics standards across 20 years helps to understand 
the development trend of the forensics industry. Initially, computer forensics 
are cases based on which investigators only randomly collected whatever 
helps to solve the case on hand. Later on, legal requirements appeared and 
urged the updates of forensics technique such as bit-by-bit copy. Meanwhile, 
the increasing digital crime cases cause the rapid forensics tool development.  
 
Thirdly, we compare different emphasis of each standard to understand what 
has been changed during the past decade. The common focus of the 
forensics industry remains on sophisticated designed forensics tools and legal 
rules of evidence. 
 
Fourthly, analysis of recent standards, we found a new trend of using built-in 
forensics features in daily applications to solve investigation issues. Also, new 
digital investigation methods such as live inspections and first responds 
appear in the business area.  
 
Most importantly, the study shows that forensics standards in technical and 
operational areas are constantly altered. On the other hand, forensics 
standards in the legal area have the least alteration during the industry 
evolution. The legal elements contain the rules of evidence and chain of 
custody which have strong connection to the term ―forensically sound‖.  
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Integrate “Forensically Sound” into SABSA Matrix 
Referring to the definition in chapter one, the term ―forensically sound‖ means 
the application of a transparent digital forensic process that preserves the 
original meaning of the data for production in a court of law. The ―transparent 
digital forensic process‖ is ensured by the ―chain of custody‖. The ―original 
meaning of the data‖ is ensured by the application of the collective rules of 
evidence.  
 
Therefore, to build the forensics overlay, the two most important forensics 
requirements that need to be integrated to the SABSA matrix are: 1) the rule 
of evidence, which are the rules that qualify the evidential data to be present 
in the court of law and 2) Chain of custody. 
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Name of the 
Standards 
 
Publisher 
 
Year 
Major Focus  
 
Description/Conclusion 
Collected 
Devices 
Forensics 
Tools 
Evidence 
Weight 
(Legal) 
Crime 
Category 
Forensics 
Operational 
Process  
Digital 
Investigation 
Background 
Forensics 
Features in 
Application 
 
 
Electronic Crime Scene 
Inv estigation: A guide for 
First Responders 1st 
Edition [48] 
 
U.S. Department of 
Justice; 
Off ice of Justice 
Programs; 
National Institute of 
Justice 
 
 
 
2001 
 
Dev ices basis 
inv estigation 
 
General tool 
kits, not 
including 
forensics 
software 
 
General rules of 
ev idence 
collected for 
digital or non 
digital crime 
 
General crimes 
such as Death 
Inv estigation, 
not specifically 
related to 
cy bercrime. 
 
 
Normal ev ident 
collection, no 
special 
operational 
digital collection 
rules 
 
 
  
Less cy bercrimes in early day,  digital 
ev idence is merely considered as a part 
of  entire collection of evidence, no 
specif ic rules are required such as bit-by -
bit copy  
 
 
Guidelines for Best 
Practice in the Forensics 
Examination of Digital 
Technology [49] 
 
 
International 
Organisation on 
Computer Evidence 
(IOCE) 
 
 
 
2002 
   
General 
principles 
apply ing to 
recover, and 
examining 
ev idence 
  
Compliant rules 
for managing 
ev idence 
collection  
 
Major f ocus on 
quality 
assurance, 
auditing 
 Prov ides a framework of standards, 
quality principles and approaches f or the 
detection, preservation, recov ery, 
examination; uses digital evidence for 
forensic purposes in compliance with the 
requirements of an accrediting body and 
or an organisation widely recognised in 
the digital forensic community.  
 
Forensic Examination of 
Digital Evidence: A Guide 
for Law Enforcement [50] 
 
U.S. Department of 
Justice; 
Off ice of Justice 
Programs; 
National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ special 
Report) 
 
 
2004 
  
Write 
protection 
rules required 
for forensics 
tools, but no 
tool vendor 
specif ied 
 
 
Strong f ocus on 
rules of 
ev idence 
assessment, 
acquisition, 
examination 
  
Entire f orensics 
procedure &  
Legal Forms 
 
Policy and 
procedure for 
case 
Management 
 
Forensics 
fav oured 
features of 
physical storage 
mentioned  
 
Intended f or use by law enforcement 
off icers and other members of the law 
enf orcement community who are 
responsible for the examination of digital 
ev idence. 
 
 
Good Practice Guide for 
Computer-Based 
Electronic Evidence [51] 
 
 
Association of Chief 
Police Officer 
 
 
 
2004 
 
 
What kinds of 
dev ices should 
be seized 
 
 
Prov iding 
Guidance for 
Forensic Tool 
Use  
 
 
 
The principles of 
computer-based 
electronic 
ev idence.  
 
Crime are 
categorised by 
diff erent crime 
scenes or 
env ironments 
such as 
Network, 
Mobile phone 
  
Major f ocus in the 
recovery of 
computer-based 
electronic 
ev idence; but still 
focus on single 
machine 
 
 
 
The guide revised and published as sign 
that digital crime are independently 
considered as a major crime in this 
society where Inf ormation Technology is 
ev er developing , and the electronic world 
and the manner in which it is investigated 
has changed considerably. 
 
 
Guide to Integrating 
Forensic Techniques into 
Incident Response [52] 
 
National Institution of 
Standards and 
technology 
Technology 
Administration 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce Department 
of  Homeland Security 
 
 
 
2006 
 
Whatev er 
dev ices seized, 
the storage of 
the dev ices 
contain the 
potential 
ev idence, 
filesystems rules 
 
Forensics 
tools have to 
apply to 
general 
functional 
and legal 
requirements 
to maintain 
integrity of 
data.  
 
NOT only legal 
requirements 
but also 
forensics 
fav oured 
policies for 
organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the term 
of   
―Lif ecycle‖ to 
describe 
forensics 
inv estigation or 
incident respond 
ev ents 
 
 
 
Major f ocus on 
forensics 
features of Data 
system, 
operating 
system, network 
system, and 
application 
 
Def inition of forensics science and the top 
lay er requirement for digital f orensics is 
preserving the integrity of the information 
and maintaining a strict chain of custody 
for the data which can be used later as 
ev idence in court.  
 
Technical rules are applied to forensics 
tools to make it compliant with laws.  
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Table 3- 2 Selected Forensics Standards
 
Name of the 
Standards 
 
Publisher 
 
Year 
Major Focus  
 
Description 
Devices 
Intro 
Forensics 
Tools 
Evidence 
Weight 
(Legal) 
Crime 
Category 
Forensics 
Operational 
Process  
Digital 
Investigation 
Background 
Forensics 
Features in 
Application 
 
 
Forensics 
Plan Guide [53] 
 
 
Sesame, Audit, 
Networking and 
Security (SANS) 
 
 
2006 
 
Physical 
storage of any 
dev ices 
 
EnCase, and 
Helix and 
Window 
forensic tool  
 
Detailed 
ev idence 
analysis rules 
  
Detailed lif ecycle 
of  forensics 
inv estigation or 
incident respond 
 
Management of 
inv estigation case 
to report 
Forensics 
features from 
Unix and 
Windows 
system, and 
email 
application 
 
A combination of a dynamic checklist and 
template for recording computer 
inv estigation processing steps and 
inf ormation. The Plan Guide is 
inv estigation case based. 
 
 
HB171 – Management of 
IT evidence* [55] 
 
 
 
 
Standards Australia 
 
 
2007 
   
 
 
Principle for the 
management of 
IT evidence 
   
 
Consider the 
forensics lif ecycle 
as IT evidence 
management 
lif ecycle 
  
Most ev idence is collected from data 
storage, and there have been well-known 
forensics tools to extract the data. This 
handbook aims to provide guidance on 
the management of electronic records 
that may be used as evidence in judicial 
or administrative proceedings, whether as 
a plaintiff, defendant or ref erral to 
appropriate authorities f or investigations. 
 
 
Electronic Crime Scene 
Inv estigation: A guide for 
First Responders 
2nd Edition [56] 
U.S. Department of 
Justice; 
Off ice of Justice 
Programs; 
National Institute of 
Justice 
(NIJ special Report) 
 
 
2008 
 
Different type 
of  storages 
  
Specific & 
detailed rules of 
ev idence collect 
 
Updated 
crime: 
Terrorism  
 
Detailed 
procedure of 
ev idence 
collection 
 
Social network, 
network crime, 
mobile phone, 
cy bercrime. 
  
Digital evidence is considered as the core 
of  digital investigation. Digital crime in 
business environment is considered.  
 
 
Digital Evidence Field 
Guide: What Every 
Peace Officer Must Know 
[57] 
 
 
U.S. Department of 
Justice; 
Federal Bureau of 
Inv estigation 
 
 
 
2009 
  Digital crime 
ev idence nature, 
rules of identify, 
protect and 
conceal the 
ev idence, legal 
consideration 
(Search warrant) 
 
Updated 
crime:  
Cy ber 
terrorism, 
corporate 
espionage, 
phishing 
  
Computer system is 
the target of a 
crime; it can also be 
an instrument of the 
intrusion or attack. 
 
 
Cy ber system 
as the 
repository of 
ev idence  
 
Digital evidence is not anymore an 
accessory of any normal crime evidence 
because computers can become a 
roadmap to a criminal‘s activ ities.  
 
Guidelines for 
Identif ication, Collection, 
and/or Acquisition and 
Preservation of Digital 
Ev idence 
Working Draft (WD 2nd) 
27037 [58] 
 
 
 
International 
Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 Highly abstracted 
ev idence 
requirements 
prov ide a 
convenient 
material for our 
project to extract 
forensics 
attributes.  
 
 
 Digital forensics is a 
mature industry but 
in its turnaround 
period due to 
technology 
dev elopment of 
cloud computing, 
network, encryption 
etc.  
 
 
Strategically 
focus on 
network 
features that 
prov ide 
forensics v alue.  
 
 
Includes key technical, operational and 
legal issues of evidence collection.  
 
Detailed fieldguide f or an investigation 
operation.  
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3.4 Summary: The Knowledge Structure of the Forensics Overlay 
So far in this thesis, we explained in chapter one the current forensics landscape and 
stated that the enterprise is a significant entity in the forensics environment. It follows 
that a new forensics model (the overlay) should include business elements, shown in 
Figure 3-4.  
 
 
 
Figure 3- 4 Business Considerations 
 
We suggest in chapter two that using the SABSA matrix, shown in Figure 3-5, as a 
foundation to create the overlay. With built-in features of the SABSA matrix, different 
perspectives of business requirements are integrated seamlessly with forensics 
requirements.  
 
 
 
Figure 3- 5 Framework of SABSA Matrix 
  
Business Content 
Business
Context
Business
Concept
Business
Policy
Business Requirements 
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This chapter shows that the forensics requirements are extracted from forensics 
knowledge. The most sought-after forensics knowledge is the forensics standard. 
Through studying the forensics standards created throughout the past decade, we 
believe the rules of evidence and chain of custody are the two elements that have the 
most solid connection with the term ―forensically sound‖. Therefore, the forensics 
requirements that cover all overlay layers should be the rules of digital evidence, shown 
in Figure 3-6. 
 
  
 
Figure 3- 6 Knowledge Structure of the Forensics Overlay 
 
To summarise the first three chapters, figure 3-6 shows the knowledge structure of the 
forensics overlay. In this blueprint, business elements are addressed via application of 
SABSA matrix while forensics elements are addressed via application of forensics 
knowledge.  
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4 Design of a Forensics Overlay 
As outlined in chapter three, a combination of the SABSA matrix and digital forensics 
knowledge provide a foundation for the forensics overlay, shown in Figure 3-6. In this 
chapter, we create the Forensics Overlay according to the previous design. The primary 
effort made to create the overlay includes 1) contextual layer, defining a set of forensics 
drivers containing business objectives 2) conceptual layer, defining a set of forensics 
attributes using the SABSA business attributes as a reference; 3) logical layer, creating 
operational policies for achieving business/forensics goals; 4) physical layer, selecting 
mechanism (or forensics features) to protect the evidence. The previous three layers 
focus on designing forensics in a business setting. The physical layer focuses on 
delivering practical services or mechanism to the business. Similar to the SABSA matrix, 
the overlay contains its own features to help the users develop solutions with each 
concerned cell. Furthermore, these features trigger more design and development to 
users‘ project related information. Similar to the SABSA model, the overlay is not 
doctrinal like a checklist or a field guide; it is dynamic and expected to suit t he different 
business forensics cases. 
 
Chapter Four:  
4.1 Explains how to create the Contextual Layer: Forensics Drivers & Evidence Threat  
4.2 Explains how to create the Conceptual Layer: Forensics Attributes Profile 
4.3 Explains how to create the Logical Layer: Policy & Forensics Service 
4.4 Explains how to create the Physical Layer: Design Forensics Mechanisms 
 
4.1 Contextual Layer 
The forensics contextual layer helps senior executives understand the forensics in a 
strategic level. This layer usually addresses the considerations for a business that start 
their forensics project in the early stage. For example, the contextual layer helps a 
business that needs to develop their forensics capabilities understanding the 
requirements of the program cost, resource, timeline, services, clients, etc. Same as all 
the following layers, forensics contextual layer has six cells: Assets (What), Motivation 
(Why), Process (How), People (Who), Location (Where) and Time (When). Only 
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contextual Assets, Motivation and Process are addressed since People, Location, and 
Time largely depend on the typical business cases.  
 
4.1.1 Assets 
The contextual assets cell addresses Business/Forensics (B/F) drivers that are 
abstracted from business goals and objectives. A B/F driver is a redefined statement of 
how forensics can help achieve the business goal. In the SABSA approach, each 
Business/Security (B/S) driver is considered as a unique sub system which needs to be 
designed for security from a business risk perspective. In the forensics overlay 
approach, each B/F driver requires defined details to understand the business forensics 
objectives on a strategic level. The difference between B/F and B/S is that B/S focuses 
more on the detection and the prevention before a cybercrime incident. The B/S drivers 
focus on the protection of the daily business, while the B/F drivers focus on the 
protection of digital evidence.  
 
Through the study of the legal and business cases concerning the business forensics 
investigations, we provide forensics business drivers to present an overview of the 
forensics expectations from a business, shown in Table 4-1. The B/F driver table shows 
a short version of a business goal and objectives. These B/F drivers are basic 
requirements from a business which aims to conduct forensics investigation in any 
cyber and business conditions and pursue further prosecution when feasible and 
necessary. On top of these basic forensics drivers, users of the overlay may add or 
change any items according to their own business situations.  
 
The Business/Forensics driver table is one of the forensics overlay features provided in 
our project. These basic features (including tables or models in other cells) are 
developed to inspire more considerations and ideas through workshops.  
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Driver No. Forensics Drivers  
FD1 Protecting the business reputation by ensuring a cybercrime free 
environment.  
FD2 Ensuring that policy makers address issues of typical cybercrime 
from both internal and external scope in terms of cybercrime 
definition, legal status, victim (which sector within the business), 
deterrence & enforcement, coordination & cooperation plan [41] 
(between corporate investigators and other part of the business, 
also between corporate investigators and investigators from law 
enforcement) [36].  
FD3 Maintaining the accuracy of information, especially those with 
potential evidential value [38].  
FD4 Providing the ability to prosecute those who attempt to defraud 
the business [38].  
FD5 Enforcing the roles and responsibilities during a cybercrime 
investigation. 
FD6 Ensuring that information processed in the business system can 
be brought to a court of law as evidence in support of both 
criminal and civil proceedings and that the court admits the 
evidence, and that the evidence withstands hostile criticism by 
the other side‘s expert witness [38].  
FD7 Minimising the number of incidence of cybercrime, highly 
offensive but not unlawful, breach of procedure, policy or 
inappropriate actions only. 
FD8 Collecting digital evidence in forensics manner no matter the 
cases of cybercrime, highly offensive but not unlawful, breach of 
procedure, policy or inappropriate actions only [37].  
FD9 Preparing and providing when required any forms of evidence 
that pertaining to a legal case to law enforcement party [37].  
FD10 Ensuring that the business system is at all times compliant with 
the laws and industry sector regulations (e.g. Forensics 
Standards), and that the system approach directly and indirectly 
supports legal compliance [38].  
FD11 Ensuring that transaction between parties cannot be denied that 
a transaction occurred [37] [38].  
FD12 Detecting and forensically maintaining any records of abusing the 
access privileges.  
FD13 Conducting investigation against any violations of enterprise 
policy. 
FD14 Ensuring the business system provides the solution that complies 
as far as possible with internal and external standards and best 
practise, adapting forensics architecture to conduct the 
enterprise system design.  
FD15 Ensuring that the forensics architecture is independent of any 
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specific vendor or product and is capable of supporting multiple 
products from multiple vendors [38].  
FD16 Providing a forensically sound awareness program to the 
employees and forensics professional training to internal 
investigator.  
FD17 Providing a backup plan for business continuity when the system 
is compromised or related to cybercrime [39].  
 
Table 4- 1 Business/Forensics Drivers for Contextual Asset  
 
4.1.2 Motivation 
The contextual motivation cell contains a list of threats that may cause the invalidation 
of digital evidence, shown in Table 4-2. A threat against digital evidence is an event with 
the potential of disclosure, modification or destruction to digital evidence contained in 
the business system. Threats may be non-malicious (like those caused by human error, 
hardware/software failures, or natural disaster) or malicious (within a range going from 
protests to irrational nature) [42]. The threats addressed on a higher level provide less 
sufficient details to typical cyber attacks, mistakes in the business and forensics 
operations. Therefore, the detail threats allocation depends on the actions taken in the 
following layers. For example, when using the forensics overlay in the business 
application development, these threats are mapped with forensics attributes in the 
conceptual layer (details explained in Section 4.2). In addition, the high level threats list 
addresses the link between threats and business context. Such linkage is usually 
ignored by many other models. 
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Threat 
No. 
Digital Evidence Threats  
ET1 Disclosure of digital evidence has the potential to compromise the 
admissibility of the evidence when the electronic stored information 
(ESI) is not obtained and handled by forensics investigators but by 
opposing party or non forensics employees [41].  
ET2 Not all media that is identified and preserved need to be processed. 
Risks stemming from reducing the amount of ESI include: a) 
Excluding potential key evidence that‘s benefic ial to your case; b) 
Violating e-discovery obligations resulting in sanctions, an adverse 
inference instruction [41].  
ET3 Unauthorised deletion or modification of digital evidence data, such 
intentional damage to information assets that result in the loss of 
integrity of the assets [42].  
ET4 Disruption against normal operation of forensics investigation and 
evidence collection, preservation, analysis and report. The reason of 
disruption can be malicious or simply a random power failure.  
ET5 Human errors by forensics investigator, high-risk employee such as 
system and network administrators.  
ET6  Decentralised information process may affect the forensics 
investigation and digital evidence collection.  
ET7 Digital offenders may hide their trace by deleting the evidence. The 
situation may occur during organised crime, political terrorists and 
highly skilled hackers. 
 
Table 4- 2 Threats against Potential Digital Evidence 
 
4.1.3 Process 
The contextual process cell addresses the factors to consider developing an enterprise 
forensics capability, shown in Figure 4-1. These factors can also be used when a 
business starts any forensics-related project, e.g. develop forensically sound application. 
These considerations enhance senior executives‘ understanding of the forensics 
capability. Therefore, the forensics requirements for the overall business goals are 
easily generated. 
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The ―Resource‖ means the internal resource to develop the forensics capability. For a 
business that begins developing its forensics capability, its internal resources can be 
limited. Typically, the business may only have the IT and Legal departments to provide 
professional advice. Initially, the project team is formed by personnel from both 
departments and senior executives. The similar situation applies to the business 
forensics projects; the only difference is that the team should include more members 
who specialised in the application development. The senior executives should make it a 
point to have an efficient balance among resource, time and cost. It is possible to 
consider the consultancy from external resources including legal and technical 
perspectives. 
 
The enterprise forensics capability includes both digital investigative capability and 
electronic discovery capability. Therefore, businesses need to consider the expense on 
building an incident response team that specialised in the entire enterprise-capable 
forensic and electronic discovery [46]. In addition, there are considerable expenses on 
the forensics software and hardware, unless the business decides to develop its 
forensically sound applications, details shown in chapter 6. All the decision should be 
made according to the business drivers in the contextual asset cell, which represents 
the overall business goals and objectives.  
 
Cells in the overlay are connected to each other to perform common tasks in enterprise 
forensics related projects. Therefore, the overlay can be seen as a combination of 
multiple cell strings which respectively deal with different issues. These cell strings 
enhance the traceability of the overlay items, shown in Figure 4-4. For example, in the 
project of the forensically sound application development, different cells across multiple 
layers forms an application development lifecycle that deal with issues of application 
requirements, application high level design and application forensics features design, 
see chapter 6 for more details. 
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Figure 4- 1 Factors to Consider for Developing Forensics Capability 
 
4.2 Conceptual Layer 
The conceptual layer deals with how diverse forensics knowledge can be applied to 
support business goals. The forensics conceptual layer designs overall forensics into a 
business by addressing the assets, motivation, process and people.  
 
4.2.1 Assets 
Equivalent to the SABSA business attributes profile (SBAP), shown in Figure 2-1, a 
forensics attribute profile is presented in the conceptual assets cell. The forensics 
attributes are extracted from forensics standards, shown in Table  3-2. As concluded in 
chapter 3, the most critical requirements from current forensics standards are those 
related to how to maintain evidential value of the business data. Table 4-3 shows the 
forensics attributes samples extracted from a forensics standard: Text for ISO/IEC 2nd 
WD 27037 – Guidelines for identification, collection and/or acquisition and preservation 
for digital evidence (WD27037) . There are five sample attributes that are extracted; 
within these five attributes, ―auditable‖, ―accountable‖, and ―repeatable‖ are quoted 
directly from WD27037, while ― less-intrusive‖ and ―informed‖ are worked out through the 
workshop analysis process.  
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During the workshop process, the attribute ―informed‖ has been extracted from the 
standard WD27037 (Section 5.4). It requests that ―it is essential that the Digital 
Evidence First Responders (DEFR) and/or Digital Evidence Specialist are adequately 
briefed by authorised personnel before he/she begins performing the tasks‖ [40]. 
Searching SBAP, the term ―informed‖ is found in the USER group and refer to a 
situation that ―The user should be kept fully informed about services, operating 
procedures, operational schedules, planned outage, etc‖ [39]. Therfore, the attribute 
―informed‖ matches the requirements from WD27037 section 5.4. The term ―inform‖ is 
redefined in terms of forensics, see Table 4-4.  
 
The redefining process is necessary since each selected attribute is based on forensics 
knowledge, while SBAP is based on security knowledge. To create the forensics 
attributes profile, re-definitions of each attributes are needed. Depending on each case, 
attributes have different definitions depending on the contextual layer and structure of 
the business. Only with such a re-definition, shown in Table 4-4, with each selected 
attribute, we add forensics implications to the overlay; otherwise, the forensics overlay 
is merely a subset of SABSA. 
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Table 4- 3 Sample Attributes Extracted from WD27037 
 
SABSA Defined ―Informed‖ [39] Forensics Overlay defined ―Informed‖  
The user should be kept fully informed 
about service, operating procedures, 
operational schedules, planned outage, 
and so on.  
Forensics procedure briefing information 
should be documented, or DEFR should 
be informed to do so. 
 
Table 4- 4 Define Attributes in Terms of Forensics 
 
The forensics attributes profile provides a conceptual requirement framework that is 
abstracted from forensics knowledge but also link with standard business requirements 
from SBAP. This framework guides the later design of the entire forensics environment. 
It connects both the business and forensics goals.  
 
Attributes Description  
* Directly Quote from Document 
 
Auditable 
 
Digital evidence specialist was capable of undertaking the processes 
and making any conclusions, with an appropriated method, technique 
and /or procedure were followed. 
 
 
Repeatable 
The same test results are produced under the following conditions:  
- Using the same measurement procedure; 
- Using instruments and conditions that are comparable to the original 
test; and 
- Can be repeated at any time after the original test 
 
Defensible 
The Digital Evidence First Responders (DEFRs) should be able to 
justify her actions and methods used for the identification, collection, 
acquisition and preservation of the potential digital evidence.  
* Extracted from Document via Analysis 
Less 
Intrusive 
Readily verified forensics method; 
Informed Forensics procedure briefing information should be documented, or 
DEFR should be informed to do so. 
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4.2.2 Motivation 
The conceptual motivation cell deals with business risk management objectives. In the 
forensics overlay, it deals with forensics risks on a high level. The forensics risks 
concentrate on human, natural and environmental threats against digital evidence or the 
correct collection of digital evidence shown in Figure 4-2. The human issue is more 
focused in this research. 
 
 
 
Figure 4- 2 Threats to Digital Evidence 
 
With the overview of the threats against digital evidence, the forensics risk management 
team‘s target is to understand the rules of evidence and enhance the usability of the 
digital evidence in the court of law. The five rules of collecting digital evidence are 
Admissible, Authentic, Complete, Reliable and Believable [8]. These rules of evidence, 
shown in Table 4-4, are based on the practice of forensics and are a key requirement to 
ensure any risks to these properties are mitigated. Therefore, organisations that are 
willing to perform standardised forensics investigations must develop the forensics 
policy in the logical layer and forensics practical rules in the physical layer. 
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The forensics conceptual cell also relates to the forensics contextual layer presenting 
the evidence threat list, shown in Table 4-2. The threat list in the conceptual motivation 
cell focuses on the overall picture and requirements, while the other forensics 
conceptual cells relate to threat management. 
 
Table 4- 5 Sample Attributes of Rules of Evidence 
 
4.2.3 Process 
The conceptual process cell outlines the organisational forensics process according to 
forensics standards and business requirements from the contextual layer. The 
organisational forensics process is different from the conventional forensics lifecycle. 
Traditionally, the forensics lifecycle includes identification, preparation, approach 
strategy, preservation, acquisition, examination, analysis, presentation and returning 
evidence, shown in Figure 3-2. However, the enterprise forensics process lifecycle 
contains more details to serve the forensics related project team, forensics investigators 
and the enterprise incident response team. The difference also lays on the fact that the 
Property Rules of Digital Evidence  
Admissible  Admissible is the most basic rule. The evidence must be able to be used 
in court or otherwise.  
Authentic  Must be able to show that the evidence relates to the incident in a 
relevant way. 
Complete It is not enough to collect evidence that just shows one perspective of the 
incident. The collected evidence must prove the attacker‘s actions, also 
their innocence. For instance, if you can show the attacker was logged in 
at the time of the incident, you also need to show who else was logged in 
and why you think they did not do it. This is called exculpatory evidence 
and is an important part of proving a case. 
Reliable The evidence collection and analysis procedures must not cast doubt on 
the evidence‘s authenticity and veracity.  
Believable The collected evidence should be presented clearly understandable and 
believable to a jury. There is no point presenting a binary dump of 
process memory if the jury has no idea what it all means. Similarly, if you 
present them with a formatted, human understandable version, you must 
be able to show the relationship to the original binary, otherwise there is 
no way for the jury to know whether you have faked it.  
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conceptual level focuses more on forensics strategies and architectural layering [47], 
while conventional forensics lifecycle focuses more on forensics operations. 
 
In the conceptual level, there is more to consider during an incident in a business 
environment. Before actually performing the tasks in the identification phase, the 
business forensics process needs to conduct the following tasks: a) Address the 
business requirements in terms of identif ing and preserving evidence; determining the 
method, time frame, and the scope of the compromise; perform investigations with as 
little disruption to the corporation as possible. b) Assess the internal/portable data 
storages and forensics features that are already built in a business system. c) Decide 
which preliminary tools would be helpful from a forensics perspective, and which parties 
(internal & external) may be involve in the investigation. d) Implement a plan for the 
preservation of logs so historical evidence is not deleted. e) Implement proper controls 
to keep the daily business running. As the business continues running with the 
investigation, the choice is made on whether to terminate the investigation. The disaster 
recovery plan should be launched if the decision is made to terminate the investigation. 
 
Considering the complexity of a forensics task performed in an enterprise environment, 
other teams are appointed along side with the forensics investigation team. Therefore, 
the conceptual process cell needs to establish an overall business/forensics lifecycle 
rather than a conventional forensics lifecycle.  
 
Inspired by Reyes, A. and J. Wiles‘s Digital investigations Standard Operat ing 
Procedures [11], we added three initial phases to the forensic lifecycle: Request for 
Business Forensics Process, Initial Analysis and Decision Making, shown in Figure 4-3.  
 
 
 
Figure 4- 3 Enterprise Forensics Procedure (EFP) 
Request for 
Services
Initial 
Analysis
Decision 
Making
Forensics 
Lifecycle
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The EFP applies the principle of the business consideration and the business team 
cooperation. The first phase shows that a formal request is needed before any forensics 
process. The request must be tracked and should be used to build metrics on how 
many investigations are initiated, by which departments, the types of cases, and how 
quickly the team addresses them [46]. The request phase shows the teamwork between 
the applicant department and the forensics team. The initial analysis is carried on by the  
forensics team. The initial analysis includes documentation, planning and identification 
of the forensics target. The decision making phase shows the teamwork between the 
forensics team and senior executives. The decision making is not a simple ―Yes or No‖ 
order, but the statement of investigation requirements which is based on the advices 
provided from the initial analysis results.  
 
4.2.4 People 
The conceptual people cell designs the forensics responsibility map according to the 
organisation structure. The cell represents a Responsibility Assignment Matrix table to 
describe how these roles  participate in the cyber investigation incident. The key 
responsibilities are described by Responsible (R), Accountable (A), Consulted (C), 
Informed (I) and Witnessed (W). The following sample matrix shows several typical 
roles in a forensics investigation activity.  
 
Roles R A C I W 
CTO  √    
Forensic Specialists √    √ 
Legal Consultants    √ √  
IT Department Members    √  √ 
Normal System Users     √ 
 
Table 4- 6 RACIW Table  
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4.3 Logical Layer 
The forensics logical layer describes and designs the forensics knowledge into the 
business environment. In the forensics logical layer, the asset should be the evidential 
information that is contained in a daily business. Without a forensics incident, the term 
―evidential information‖ is an indistinct concept; on the other hand, with forensics 
incident and investigation, all relevant information has the potential to be evidence. 
Relevant information includes data that is generated by investigators such as the crime 
scene pictures, notes and interview records. We decided to leave the assets cell blank 
so that during a typical forensics cases, logical assets can be filled. Without a typical  
forensics case, the logical assets cell contains all the defined enterprise information.  
 
4.3.1 Motivation 
The logical motivation cell aims to help design the organisational forensics policy to 
protect potential evidence. The logical policy design ensures 1) the business 
compliance to the evidence rules located in conceptual motivation cell and 2) the 
business mitigation planning against the evidence threats located in contextual 
motivation cell. The business may consider designing the forensics policy in five (or 
more) perspectives includes technical, functional, environmental, legal, and political.  
 
Technically, the current business usually deploys the complex networking, computing 
and application technologies. These technologies are not traditionally designed in a 
forensics manner. The issue on how to design a good policy to select, deploy, and 
implement those technologies are challenging for a business/forensics environment. A 
business has to conduct its daily business through various technologies and 
applications. It is complicated to assure various business systems work together, it is 
even more complicated to assure them to work in a forensics manner when incidents 
occurs and the investigation follow. 
 
  
67 
 
Environmentally, the policies should address how to manage and obtain the knowledge 
of a cybercrime affected environment. Many factors are involved in this policy design, 
such as legal requirements, the type of the incident, the forensics tools, disk storage, 
network capacity and access issues. 
  
Legally, it is the policy makers‘ responsibility to design an effective regulation to ensure 
the business compliance with industrial forensics standards.  
 
Politically, the forensics policy involves various parties of the business such as 
corporate clients, business partners, the press, legal organisations, and law 
enforcement. 
 
With all these five perspectives, questions that need to be asked to the architecture 
designers are: Which department‘s responsibility to protect potential evidence. What is 
the department responsible for, where are the forensics targets? When is the forensics 
supports needed and Why. A matrix is designed to assist setting up the enterprise 
forensics policy, shown in Table 4-6. 
 
 
Table 4- 7 Forensics Policy Matrix 
 
4.3.2 Process 
The logical process cell defines the forensics services for a business system. It is 
derived vertically from the conceptual process cell. The forensics service is abstracted 
from the conceptual forensics process to interpret what kind of forensics function should 
be performed in the business procedure. One of the most critical forensics services from 
 Who  What Where When Why 
Technically      
Functionally      
Environmentally      
Legally      
Politically      
More …      
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business systems is providing the evidential data when necessary. This service is later 
used in the physical layer to generate forensics mechanism such as system logs, 
configuration files, etc, shown in Figure 4-4. The other important service is to verify the 
business data in a forensics manner, which is later applied in the physical layer to 
generate forensics mechanism such as MD5 Hash.  
 
 
 
Figure 4- 4 Traceability of the Forensics Process between Overlay Levels 
 
4.3.3 People 
The people cell in the SABSA logical layer contains an entity & trust framework. 
Basically, it specifies how to manage the different entities such as supplier  groups & 
customer groups to trust each other during a digital transaction.  
 
In the case of forensics, the end-to-end evidence transactions occurs between the 
organisations and the court of law. The mechanism used in between can be technically 
a digital signature and operationally a chain of evidence. Therefore, in the forensics 
logical people cell, we present a forensics trust framework to help the business 
understand the evidential association between entities, shown in Figure 4-5. 
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Figure 4- 5 Trusted Evidence Transferring 
 
4.3.4 Location 
According to the SASBA method, the logical location cell is originally used to define a 
set of security domains and associations in between. It is important to differentiate the 
physical domain from the logical domain. A physical domain is a location to establish 
the services that have been designed in a logical domain. For example, the SABSA 
logical domain defines the security domains and associations, while the SABSA 
physical domain defines the platform and network infrastructure.  
 
Different from the SABSA logical domain (security domains and associations), the 
forensics logical domain has a certain hierarchy during a forensics incident, there are 
some regulations made by the authority (e.g. the court of law). Those regulations must 
be complied by the business and the related sub-domains. Furthermore, the business 
passes these rules to their customers, partners, etc, shown in Figure 4-5. The forensics 
domain association is a type of regulation enforcement but not a service. Fail to apply 
these rules in the evidence management leads the business in an inferior position in 
any further prosecutions. In the forensics logical location cell, we present a forensics 
policy domain sample and its regulation enforcement association. In the forensics policy 
domain map, the regulation authority makes the rules by law or precedent regulation. 
The precedent regulations include the previous issued judgement or opinions [45].  
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Figure 4- 6 Forensics Policy Domain Map 
 
4.4 Physical Layer 
The physical layer defines the forensics activities that dif ferent roles are performing in a 
business. Given different responsibilities of roles (defined in the logical layer policies), 
some roles such as the production manager may not perform forensics activities; while 
some roles such as internal forensics investigator whose daily jobs are forensics related 
duties. However, if a production manager does not follow the forensics related policies, 
the forensics investigator may fail to get evidence from the production environment. 
Therefore, the physical layer also focuses on raising the awareness of forensics across 
different roles in an enterprise environment. For example, the business application 
developers apply rules of evidence into the business system development.  
 
4.4.1 Motivation 
The physical motivation cell addresses a set of easily understood rules for both the 
forensics teams and other business teams. These rules should be derived from the 
Rules of Evidence in a conceptual motivation cell and an Organisational Forensics 
Policy in the logical motivation cell. A sample DO and DO NOT list is present in Table 4-
7 [43].  
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Items DO & DO NOT list 
L1 Minimise handling and corruption of original data. 
L2 Account for any changes and keep detailed logs of your actions. 
L3 Comply with the five rules of evidence. 
L4 Do not exceed your knowledge. 
L5 Follow your local forensics policy. 
L6 Capture as accurate image of the system as possible.  
L7 Be prepared to testify. 
L8 Work fast. 
L9 Proceed from volatile to persistent evidence. 
L10 Don‘t shutdown before collecting evidence. 
L11 Don‘t run any programs on the affected system.  
 
Table 4- 8 DO and DONOT List 
 
The list is easily understood for those none forensically trained IT employees who are 
most likely summoned to draw their own conclusions in the early stage of a cyber 
incident. On the other hand, the business application developers also benefit from the 
list which is treated as one resource of the practical system development requirement.  
 
4.4.2 Process 
The process cell presents the mechanisms to protect and preserve the evidence. For 
example, the hashing mechanism applied to Email data of the header, body, and 
attachments [44]. Forensics mechanisms are varied depending on the different 
forensics tasks (with different business goals and requirements) planned in the 
contextual layer and also derived from the forensics services in the logical layer, shown 
in Figure 4-4. 
 
4.4.3 People 
In the forensics overlay, the physical people cell addresses the issues related to the 
users or user interfaces of forensics services. Since forensics services are included in 
an overall business service, the user includes both normal business users and forensics 
specialists. The specialists are qualified to use certain forensics services than other 
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users. For example, a forensics investigator is more eligible in collecting evidential data 
than an accountant. In some cases, the forensics service such as checking email user‘s 
data should be only accessible to forensics specialists. In these cases, the 
authentication mechanism should be applied in the users‘ interface or a higher level. It 
is critical to use an authentication method to validate all the entities involved in the crime 
scene—the user using the application, the system that is being used, and the 
application being used on the system by a user [67].  
 
It can be ambiguous to decide the role based authentication policy if a business does 
not have a well structured role and responsibility framework, see Table 4-5. For 
example, if a business has an IT department performing the forensics functions, IT staff 
who has no forensics training may accidentally damage the evidential data or similarly, 
they are potential cyber offenders. 
 
4.5 Component Layer 
The SABSA model includes security standards in the component motivation cell since 
the SABSA model initialises its process by considering only the business objectives and 
goals to generate the business drivers. In terms of the forensics overlay, both business 
and forensics standards are considered to generate the Business/Forensics drivers. 
Forensics standards as well as forensics knowledge are not a single layer in the 
forensics model; instead they are a set of ubiquitous fundamental rules that guide the 
entire design of the forensics overlay. Therefore, the component motivation cell is left 
empty. 
 
The SABSA model also includes security tools in the component process cell. However, 
in terms of forensics, we do not consider the forensics tools as the only solution to 
perform a perfect forensics operation. Sometimes the vendor tool does not work as the 
business requirements. For example, one tool captures volatile data but cannot display 
the data unless it is connected to the target system. In this case, after the incident is 
over, there is no way to view the volatile evidence. There are occasions on which a 
vendor‘s remote forensics tools and other tools cannot be used for network access 
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reasons. In terms of the forensics overlay, one of the goals is to assist developing 
forensics features into business systems so that the forensics mechanisms are built in 
the system or software. By doing so, we are able to reduce the increasing workload on 
designing, developing and testing forensics tools, we can also reduce the overly 
reliance on forensics tools. Therefore, the forensics component process cell is purposly 
left blank. For some businesses that decide to largely depend on third party tools, 
should be able to find relevant contents in the component layer. 
 
4.6 Operational Layer 
The forensics operational layer contains the chain of custody issues which has been 
described in detail in many relevant literatures. Therefore, we only address the chain of 
custody in the operational process cell. 
 
4.7 Forensics Overlay 
The SABSA methodology has a legal subset about the forensics issues. The SABSA 
business profile contains a set of legal attributes as the legal requirements are part of 
the enterprise security requirements. However, the forensics overlay, shown in Figure 4-
7, is not simply using the legal contents that are already contained in SABSA. Instead, 
the forensics overlay considers forensics requirements as crucial as business & security 
requirements. That means the forensics standards are not considered as a tools on the 
component layer but as forensics requirements in the strategic level.  
 
4.7.1 Layers 
The forensics overlay contains five layers; each layer presents its unique focus. The 
tasks assigned to each layer are conducted by different roles within an organisational 
structure. Different layers are not isolated from each other. The hierarchy of the overlay 
can represent the lifecycle of a forensics project. Contextual layer is about 
understanding the business requirements. Conceptual layer is about analys ing the 
business requirements. Logical layer is about designing the system with requirements. 
Physical layer is about implementing the actually system development. It is important to 
notice that the physical layer does not contain detail elements for coding and 
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programming since the entire forensics overlay is not only designed for software 
development. The forensics overlay can also be used to guide the enterprise policy 
making, investigations, forensics management, etc. 
 
Forensics Layer Description  
Contextual Layer Understanding business goals and forensics requirements 
Conceptual Layer Supporting business goals using forensics rules and standards 
Logical Layer Designing business with forensics standards 
Physical Layer Developing business system in forensic manner  
Operational Layer Relevant chain of custody issues 
 
Table 4- 9 Overlay Layers 
 
4.7.2 Cells 
The forensics overlay contains 15 cells in total. Every cell has a unique focus depending 
on both the layer and the cell references, shown in Figure 4-6. The cells in the 
contextual layer are considered as the ―root‖ of the following cells in the lower layer. The 
developments of the following cells are based on the business/forensics goals. Through 
the conceptual and logical design, the cells in the physical layer provide physical 
solutions for business forensics goals. 
 
To deal with a typical business forensics issue, some of the cells can be connected as a 
string view (or tree view) structure from the contextual layer to the physical layer. Such 
tree view provides traceability and hierarchy of a forensics project process, detailed in 
forensics email client function design in chapter 6.  
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Figure 4- 7 Design of a Forensics Overlay 
 
In this thesis, we introduced the background knowledge of SABSA, the forens ics 
knowledge, the forensics industry and the cybercrime evolution. We analysed the 
current forensics model and suggested that a new model is needed. We created a new 
forensics overlay as a new model for the enterprise forensics environment.  
 
In the next chapter, we further analyses the current enterprise forensics environment. A 
case study is presented to describe forensics pros and cons in an enterprise 
environment. By presenting the issues in a current business forensics case, we provide 
one solution to build a forensics business environment using the forensics overlay.  
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5 Digital Forensics in a Business Environment 
Section 3.1.3 illustrates how current digital forensics industries face challenges from 
technological perspectives and how current businesses emphasise on using forensics 
tools for evidence collection from limited areas. This chapter also focuses on business 
perspectives explaining the trends of business information management (BIM) and how 
digital forensics is implemented in a business environment.  
 
Chapter Five:  
5.1 Introduces the Trend of BIM in Terms of Digital Forensics 
5.2 Describes the Static Forensics Implementation in Business Environments 
5.3 Describes the Live Forensics Implementation and Limitations 
5.4 Provides an Enterprise Forensics Investigation Case Study and Related Issues  
5.5 Proposes a Forensically Sound application Development as a Solution 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Most businesses generally have a certain level of forensics capability. However, 
conventional forensics capability does not fulfil the current digital investigation 
requirements because of two reasons.  
 
Firstly, the increasingly sophisticated cybercrime requires a higher level of forensics 
professionalism. Many businesses develop forensics capabilities from their IT and legal 
departments. Such limited forensics capabilities can only afford to solve lower level 
investigation cases. Evidence collection is required to serve more sophisticated cyber 
cases that further develop into prosecution. It follows that the business has to call for 
external cyber crime forensics assistances. In this case, the IT department turns into the 
victim that provides only informative assistance for the external forensics force. 
Furthermore, the information collected from the victims are generally considered as the 
anecdotal evidence which are less weighted than the testimonial or statistical evidence 
generated by the victims‘ computer applications [59]. Due to more focus on litigation 
preparation, businesses have to develop their forensics department to take charge of 
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using forensics tools to retrieve digital evidence; the downside of using forensics tools 
has been introduced in section 3.1.3. 
 
The second challenge with conventional business forensics capabilit ies is that current 
businesses adopt a centralised information management style. This requires centralised 
e-discovery capabilities rather than a conventional forensics method. This trend can be 
demonstrated from the fact of increasing adoptions of centralised enterprise content 
management applications [59]. To collect evidence from these applications we need 
sophisticated forensics tools. That is the reason why many enterprise forensics experts 
desire the ―perfect working together‖ situation among all enterprise applications, 
including line-of-business, applications and corporate business support systems, as well 
as litigation support platforms [61]. To achieve the ―perfect working together‖ situation 
among all business applications, the first step is to develop the forensically sound 
application; details are further described in section 5.5. Despite the prediction of the 
―perfect situation‖, more effort is still devoted to improve the current two forensics 
methods: static and live forensics.  
 
5.2 Static Forensics Implementation in a Business Environment 
Static forensics (SF) is a traditional and foundational acquisition approach to obtain 
evidential data from a halted system. The critical process of static forensics is to make a 
forensics image of the target storage and verify the copy with forensics mechanism 
such as the Hash function. SF challenges are triggered by new technologies such as 
Data Encryption.  
 
Since 2007, researches started to address the issue that SF lacks ―real-time‖ forensics 
capability which is critical for monitoring current network/enterprise environments and 
collecting evidence across various live business applications. In addition, SF‘s post-
mortem forensic techniques may cause significant disruption to the evidence gathering 
process by breaking active network connections and un-mounting encrypted disks [65]. 
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5.2.1 SF Deficiencies 
The first deficiency of SF evidence collection is that the traditional SF‘s pull-the-plug 
action sacrifices valuable potential evidence contained in the RAM. Potential evidence 
includes encryption secrets, running process information, active network connection 
information, hosts interactions, etc. Therefore, in a case when the volatile data is 
considered critical, a live forensics method should be applied.  
 
The second deficiency challenge is from using data encryption, especially the Full Disk 
Encryption (FDE) function such as Microsoft Bitlocker, which protects the storage data 
from the sector level. FDE leaves three options for the forensics industry [63]. Firstly, 
using live forensics to analyse the target in real time may help obtain the passphrase in 
volatile storage; secondly, manage to obtain the passphrase in any means such as 
interviews or interrogations; thirdly, cooperation between forensics tool vendors and 
FDE function vendors to design forensics features in FDE software. 
 
The third deficency is that SF has trouble collecting evidence from a pervasive 
enterprise network; details have been introduced in section 3.1.3. The increasingly 
sophisticated network technology impacts the static forensics environment since there 
maybe data constantly written to the system from network and overwrites potential 
evidence in the process [64]. On the other hand, in an enterprise/network environment, 
forensics is more addressed on monitoring the business rather than post-mortem 
investigation of a cyber event. Therefore, businesses start to consider a newly forensics 
methodology – Network forensics, which is considered as a form of live investigation.  
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5.3 Live Forensics Implementation in a Business Environment 
From the study of SF defiencies, businesses and forensics industries believe Live 
Forensics (LF) overcomes the challenges of SF and is the next generation of the digital 
investigation method. Compared to static forensics which attempts to preserve all (disk) 
evidence in an unchanging state, LF seeks to take a snapshot of the state of the 
computer similar to a photograph of the scene of the crime [68]. In a narrow view, LF 
can be categorised as a memory forensics method. In board view, the live forensics 
definition is not standardised. According to [69], live forensics investigations refers to 
collections of dynamic and volatile data from live or production environments such as a 
network environment. 
 
5.3.1 LF Challenges 
The LF researches may underestimate the challenges to LF. Schwartz, E. (2010) [70] 
states that using specially designed tools are still the predominant method for live 
forensics investigators to gain a memory image as the first step in a live forensics 
investigation. Firstly, the overreliance on forensics tools is a significant issue, explained 
in chapter 3. Secondly, LF is not as simple as ―gain a memory image‖ . It requires more 
sophisticated investigation methods for the complex business system. 
 
In Carvey, H. and E. Casey‘s work [71], the windows command lines are executed to 
gain volatile information from the Windows Operating System. To prevent a 
compromised Windows system forges the command line results, a live CD is used to 
avoid modification of the windows commands. Such implementation has one major 
attribute, which is using system built-in features to conduct system investigations, 
instead of using third party forensics tools. It has one challenge that these built-in 
features need to be designed and developed in a forensics manner, details are 
explained in later sections.  
 
Another major live forensics type is network forensics which is applied mostly in an 
enterprise environment. Network forensics is mostly real-time based and ―reconstructs 
the network events to provide definitive insight into the actions and behaviours of users, 
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devices, and applications‖ [70]. However, with the dynamic nature of an active network 
system, it is not feasible to collect the evidence that as consistent as by SF [72]. 
Network forensics may be able to ―reconstruct‖ the network events, but it is not able to 
reproduce the evidence [68]. Thus, LF-collected evidence is reasonably questioned in 
term of Repeatability. Furthermore, according to Locard's principle that ―the 
perpetrator(s) of a crime comes into contact with the scene, so the perpetrator(s) both 
bring something into the scene and leave with something from the scene‖ [71]. The live 
investigation action is a direct ―contact with the (potential) crime scene‖, and hence it 
may threat the Integrity of the evidence.  
 
In a business/network environment, current network forensics technology and 
operations focus more on incident response (case based), network real time monitoring, 
anti-malware and anti-virus analysis. These activities are more of a preventive and 
defensive solution to network crimes, while the actual purpose of the network forensics 
is against cybercrimes by real-time collecting admissible evidence and resorting to legal 
solutions. Due to short response time, the internal cyber investigators are not able to 
instantly respond with the external law enforcement cyber investigators [74]. Such lack 
of the cooperation with law enforcement may lead the business reluctant to pursue 
further litigation.  
 
Even though LF overcomes some weaknesses of SF, it does not imply that LF should 
replace SF. Therefore, the current situation is using both methods and trying to work out 
the best forensics solution for the enterprise/network environment.  
 
5.3.2 Hybrid Implementation of Both SF & LF in a Business Environment 
Brown, C. L. T. (2010) [73] claims that ―some investigators choose to take advantage of 
live forensics analysis for preview-and-cause justifications or long-term employee 
investigations and conduct a black bag operation to image a disk locally from a dead 
system based on the pre-investigation confirmation of suspicions‖. This statement 
describes different roles of SF and LF in today‘s business environment.  
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With the real-time evidence collection, the business can make the judgment and decide 
the following actions. Also, with a successful LF, businesses can also identify the 
possible target of the following SF investigation. After all, the decision of contacting law 
enforcement authorities is determined by the organisation‘s management [74]. That 
means in case of an insufficient live evidence collection, the business may make the 
decision to turn an investigation event into a pure defensive network security event.  
 
For instance, in a business cyber attack case, business decision makers decide 
whether to pursuit a further legal action or simply mitigate the harm and restore the 
business process. Therefore, incident response is taking place, aiming to collect certain 
amount of initial materials to help make business decisions. These initial materials are 
provided through live forensics which is not required to shut down the entire business 
system. To make decisions is a complicated business procedure that is not concerned 
in this research. However, if the decision is made to take further legal action, more 
materials need to be collected, preserved and analysed. These further forensics actions 
should not affect the daily business progress. Therefore, businesses require the 
convenience of using forensics features in live situations. In this case, we suggest that a 
business should develop its own forensically sound application that contains forensics 
features. 
 
To understand more about the LF/SF combination and evident collection issues, we 
refer Case Study [75] to provide a picture of a current enterprise digital crime 
investigation combined with ―live forensics‖ and ―static forensics‖, followed by a 
discussion of a critical issue of current forensics investigation.  
 
5.4 Case Study [75] 
A disenchanted insider has authorised access to trade secrets. The victim organisation 
received notice from a business competitor that it had received communication from an 
unidentified individual offering information from the victim ‘s organisation on a monthly 
basis in exchange for an ongoing financial stipend. The victim‘s organisation had all the 
standard protections in place to electronically monitor computer and network usage, 
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including network sensors that collected and analysed data transmitting throughout the 
environment, proxy servers to monitor Web activity, and data loss prevention products 
to monitor malicious behaviour on users‘ computers. Figure 5-1 shows the enterprise 
investigation action flow chart. 
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Figure 5- 1 Enterprise Forensics Action Flow Chart 
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This case study represents a typical corporate investigation against an inside threat. 
The flow chart simply shows (from the left column to right column): Investigation 
process (Ix), Forensics process (Fx), and the outcome of each step (Ox). From I1 to I10, 
are the LF processes, which involve forensics interviews, network surveillance and 
computer surveillance. Before I7, the investigators did not achieve much even with their 
daily monitoring data collection. In F7, there is an unusual event occurrence that 
triggers the following series of live investigation from I8 to I11. I11 is the result action 
taken by the likely-identification of the suspect and it is the part where SF is conducted.  
 
The LF process has been taken in most of the investigation period to draw a possible 
conclusion, while the conventional SF is only taken as a final strike to get the storage 
evidence. However, we notice that the forensically sound processes, including four 
chains of custody created (F1, 3, 10, 11), have been taken since even the interview 
phase (starts from F1 to the end) in order to provide the admissibility of the collected 
outcome data (from O1 to O11). Unfortunately, process F2 is left non-existant since a 
―Potential Disgruntled Employees List‖ is  not convincing enough to draw any forensics 
conclusions. Therefore, no action is taken except a normal documentational process for 
the ―Disgrunteled Employee List‖.  
 
5.4.1 Issues  
The case study should provide seemlessly potential evidence to the court. Based on the 
situation, the court would accept the ―potential evidence‖ as ―court presentable evidence‖ 
by granting admissibility to them. However, from the perspective of our research, we like 
to address some issues from I4-F4-O4, I5-F5-O5 and I6-F6-O6, shown in Table 5-1. 
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Procedure & Outcomes Issues Forensically Sound 
Solution 
I4  Installation of surveillance 
software for monitoring & 
collection of keystrokes, 
screen shots, web activity 
& USB activity 
Only the installation 
process was 
forensically 
documented. 
Investigators fully 
trust that the 
software is 
developed and 
works in forensics 
manner. 
Design and implementation of 
forensics features in daily 
used business applications 
such as email clients.  
Collected data required to be 
secured, verified and backup 
in a forensics manner.  
 
Chain of custody maybe 
provided. 
F4  Installation documented 
O4  Installation documentation 
 
I5  Deploy forensics software 
to permit remote collection 
and preservation of data 
from the target system 
Investigators fully 
trust that the 
software is 
developed and 
works in forensics 
manner. 
Secure the remote control of 
the target in forensics 
manner; make sure the daily 
business data flow does not 
harm the integrity of data. 
Collected data required to be 
secured, verified and backup 
in forensics manner. Chain of 
custody must be provided. 
F5  Installation documented 
O5  Installation documentation 
 
I6  Installation of network 
sensors 
To some level, 
make change to the 
business network 
environment, 
network sensor 
need to be 
controlled to cause 
least affect on 
business, and 
forensics data. 
Design and implement 
forensics features in network 
system so that it functions 
along side with daily business 
network.  
F6  Installation documented 
O6  Installation documentation 
 
Table 5- 1 Issues of an Enterprise Forensics Action 
 
The problems in these procedures are simply that only the ―Forensics tool installation‖ 
processes are documented; the evidence of ―transmitting secrets to unauthorised 
outsiders‖ is collected. However, the action is not completed in a forensics manner. 
Therefore, according to [75], the outcome of this investigation can only result in 
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termination of the employee, while ―the victim organisation should choose to present the 
evidence to law enforcement for potential criminal action, law enforcement would be 
positioned to leverage forensically sound evidence that would withstand judicial scrutiny‖ 
[75]. 
 
5.5 Proposed Solution 
In this chapter, we have introduced two mainstream forensics methods, and a case 
study of a business cybercrime situation. In this section, we propose forensically sound 
application (FSA) development as a new method, briefed in section 1.2.  
 
5.5.1 “Forensics-Friendly Features” are NOT “Forensics Features” 
The digital forensics targets include victim applications that relates to a cybercrime. 
Within these applications and systems, there are some features containing appreciable 
attributes that may help digital investigations. Examples of these features include: 
Windows built-in command in Windows Operating System [71], File Creation Time 
(FCT) and Modify Time (FMT) in Microsoft office documents, shown in Figure 5-2, 
Microsoft Windows OS built-in log file [77], history file, cookies and Temp Files in Web 
browsers [78] [88] and the list goes on. Providing convenience for forensics 
investigators, these features are referred as ―Forensics-Friendly Features‖ [76]. 
However, they are not ―Forensics Features‖.  
 
Forensics features are designed and developed with specific requirements from 
business/forensics and law enforcement. These requirements provide attributes (e.g. 
Tamper-Resistant) to these features that make them different from ―Forensics -Friendly 
Features‖. Currently, most of these forensics features can only be found in forensics 
tools, for example EnCase data acquisition implements a software write-block on all 
devices [64]. On the other hand, mainstream applications or operating systems are 
designed with other requirements in mind, for example user friendliness, performance, 
flexibility, expandability, and more recently security. They were not specifically designed 
according to forensics requirements.  
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Figure 5- 2 FCT and FMT in Microsoft Office Documents 
 
5.5.2 From “Forensics Requirements” to “Forensics Features”  
An application with features that are designed with forensics requirements is a 
forensically sound application, which provides system-generated-material presented as 
evidence to stands in a court of law. Therefore, among all forensics requirements, the 
rules of evidence are the most critical one. The rules of evidence provide the criteria for 
evidential materials to be 1) qualified to be presented in the court, 2) have strong 
arguments. Therefore, ―qualified to be presented in the court‖ (admiss ibility) is the 
precondition of all rules of evidence, shown in Table 4-4. To achieve admissibility, there 
are many attributes need to be applied. Among all attributes, Figure 5-3 uses ―Integrity‖ 
as an example to show how a forensically sound application feature is developed.  
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Figure 5- 3 Design Process of a Forensically Sound Application 
 
With Figure 5-3, it is easy to explain why a Web browser is NOT a forensically sound 
application. Firstly, a Web browser provides the ability for all users to check the 
browsing history. The history features are equivalently accessible for forensics experts 
and other users (includes suspects). Secondly, the suspects are able to tamper with the 
history information that forensics experts are trying to reconstruct.  
 
5.5.3 Designing and Developing Forensically Sound Applications for Businesses  
With the change of the digital crime landscape, in the contextual layer, complying 
business/forensics requirements is compulsory. Designing forensics in an operational 
level means there should be business policies and regulations set up for enterprise 
investigation events which rely on forensics techniques, forensics tools and business 
applications with built-in forensics features.  
 
By using the overlay, explained in chapter 4, we propose that developing a forensically 
sound application is equally important to using forensics investigation tools. In the 
requirement phase, we consider both business situations and forensics standards. In 
the design phase, we integrate forensics knowledge to business application design. In 
the implementation phase, we create forensics features according to the design.  
 
  
Forensics Requirements 
Rules of Evidence Rules of Evidence 
Admissibility Admissibility
Integrity Forensics Attributes
Tamper-Resistant Forensics Feature
Write-blocker
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The outcome of the entire development process is not only a piece of software, but also 
related documents for the business operation. These documents include Business Drive 
Table, Digital Evidence Attributes, Digital Evidence Threat List, and Organisational 
Policy to protect Digital Evidence, Forensics Services and Forensics Features 
(Mechanisms) to protect evidence, shown in Figure 5-4. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5- 4 High Level Design of Business Forensically Sound Application 
 
To further extend the idea of forensically sound applications, we propose to build up the 
forensics concerns into all perspectives in an enterprise/network environment, 
depending on the business IT strategies, such as cloud computing or centralised 
content management. With raised business/forensics concerns and design, the future 
business should form a forensics culture and environment.  
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90 
 
6 Design of a Forensically Sound Email Client with the Overlay 
This chapter describes the implementation details of the experiments conducted for this 
thesis. There are two purposes of this experiment. Firstly, test the overall usability of the 
forensics overlay that was built based on the forensics knowledge and the SABSA 
matrix. Secondly, test the feasibility in developing a forensically sound email client. 
According to Figure 5-4, the overlay helps generate related documents for the email 
operation. In addition, this chapter focuses on designing forensics features for an email 
client.  
  
Chapter Six: 
6.1 Explains the role of the Email client as a testing platform 
6.2 Describes the forensics process requirements for an email client 
6.3 Demonstrates the key forensics features 
6.4 Demonstrates the implementation code for a forensically sound email client  
 
6.1 Email Client as a Testing Platform 
The increasing malicious usage of email in a business environment has drawn the 
attention of business decision makers concerned about threats from organised crime 
targeting businesses‘ intellectual property [79]. During an electronic crime (e-crime) in 
business situations, the malicious business insider plays devastating roles through 
sending business secrets via emails. The current email system design is based on the 
server & client mode, performing the general function of sending and receiving forms of 
messages. However, as a mainstream business application, email clients are not design 
and developed with forensics concerns. There are limited forensics features within both 
client and server systems. Such situations result in forensics investigators having only 
two ways to gather evidence from emails. The first way is to locate the origin of an email 
that has been received. The second way is to gather email from an email server [80]. 
Both ways require great assistance through forensics tools. Also, there are no forensics 
mechanisms for message encryption and integrity check from the sender [81].  
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In a live forensics situation, it is practical for a forensics investigator to collect evidence 
from the suspect‘s email client, because it does not involve 1) demanding email 
evidence from an externally hosted email provider [82]; 2) accessing the company-
owned servers, which has two drawbacks. Firstly, not many company-owned mail 
servers are designed with forensics features. That means an investigator may have to 
maintain the integrity of an entire mail server and prove it.  Secondly, accessing mail 
servers against the business requirements ―Minimise the impact on daily used systems 
during investigations‖, shown in Table 4-1. Thus, it is practical to initial ise the 
investigation from the Email client‘s side (suspect‘s host) and it is critical to have 
forensics features built in the Email client.  
 
6.2 Using the Overlay to Design Email Client Forensics Features 
We apply the forensics overlay to design an email client that aims to facilitate a 
business environment free from e-crimes. The overlay outlines a software development 
lifecycle (SDLC) with its top-down layout. Through the process of understanding and 
implementing different cells in each layer, the forensics features can be listed in the 
Physical Process Cell. The cells that perform major tasks in SDLC are highlighted and 
connected to show the tractability of the forensics design, shown in Figure 6-1. With the 
connection of the highlighted cells, a typical forensics/business requirement should be 
able to find the related forensics features (controls). Figures 6-2 illustrates all 
highlighted cells and explains the process of mapping the overlay layers with SDLC. 
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Figure 6- 1 Forensics Overlay Tractability 
 
In Figure 6-2, business and forensics requirements are formed as a list of business 
drivers. The drivers (Table 4-1) are used to abstract the forensics attributes (Table 4-3 & 
4-4). With the attributes, the design team is able to identify the forensics service within 
an enterprise environment, where business applications are widely used. Therefore, 
with different business applications, the forensics services should be applied. To 
achieve the forensics service, relevant forensics features (controls) need to be designed 
and implemented. Remaining cells in the overlay provide the support to the forensics 
management. 
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Figure 6- 2 Mapping the Overlay Layers with SDLC 
 
6.3 Forensics Features for an Email Client 
Following the process described in section 6.2; we present Table 6-1 to list all 
business/forensics requirements, attributes, controls, services, and features. Based on 
this Forensics Design Process table, all features are developed.  
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Business &  
Forensics Driver (FD) 
Forensics  
Attributes 
Objectives Forensics  
Service 
Forensics 
Control 
FD15 Ensuring that the 
forensics architecture 
is independent of any 
specif ic vendor or 
product and is capable 
of  supporting multiple 
products from multiple 
vendors. 
Traceable 
 
Traceability f rom 
business requirement 
to application forensics 
control 
Using SABSA 
forensics ov erlay 
design email client 
for business 
 
 
Physical process cell contains the 
consideration of f orensics control 
contents Architecturally  
open 
Using SABSA to design 
an email client instead 
of  using vendor 
specif ied email client 
Regulated Email client designed, 
implemented, operated 
in accordance with the 
forensics regulations 
FD3 Maintaining the 
accuracy of 
inf ormation, especially 
those with potential 
ev idential v alue. 
Accurate Maintaining the 
accuracy of sent email 
inf ormation 
 
 
Forensics server for 
email client 
Real time record when the Send 
button is clicked and HASH check 
for every Send button clicked 
FD17 Prov iding a backup 
plan for business 
continuity when the 
system compromised 
or related to 
cy bercrime. 
Recov erable  Data stored in forensics 
server are recoverable 
 
Forensics Back up f unction f or the 
Forensics server 
FD4 Prov iding the ability to 
prosecute those who 
attempt to defraud the 
business. 
Admissible Make sure the data in 
forensics server fulf il 
the requirements of 
admissibility  
Forensics Reporting 
service 
Hash function for sent email data 
forensics logs and service data 
storage 
FD5 Enf orcing the roles and 
responsibilities during a 
cy bercrime 
inv estigation. 
Accessible Forensics investigators 
are able to access the 
sent email info 
Forensics 
inv estigator interface 
 
Forensics 
inv estigator account 
 
 
Account  
authentication Access-controlled Accessibility needs to 
be controlled  
Accountable Both Normal users and 
inv estigators are able 
to access email clients  
Authenticated Each party should have 
their identity verified 
Authorised Forensics investigator 
should be authorised 
by  the law enforcement 
and the business owner 
Forensics investigator detail record 
Search warrant detail record 
FD6 Ensuring that 
inf ormation processed 
in the business system 
can be brought to a 
court of law as 
ev idence in support of 
both criminal and civ il 
proceedings and that 
the court admits the 
ev idence, and that the 
ev idence withstands 
hostile criticism by the 
other side‘s expert 
witness.  
 
 
 
 
 
Integrity-assured 
 
 
 
 
 
Integrity of sent email 
data should be 
protected to prov ide 
assurance of ev idence 
admissibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
The action of using 
email client is 
recorded and 
recorded data need 
to be hash protected 
 
 
 
 
 
SHA1 f unction f or forensics logs and 
service data storage  
FD11 Ensuring that 
transaction between 
parties cannot be 
denied that a 
transaction occurred.  
Non-repudiable The sender are not 
able to deny the email 
sending action is taken 
by  the account owner 
User account locked 
up 
Email account is bind to a locked 
account that cannot be changed (no 
‗f rom‘) 
FD7 Minimising the number 
of incidence of 
cy bercrime, highly 
off ensive but not 
unlawf ul, breach of 
procedure, policy or 
inappropriate actions 
only. 
Inf ormed Minimise the crime 
incidence to the lowest 
lev el by awareness of 
the forensics function 
User Warning  Prov ide warning message to inform 
the users that the sent emails are 
recorded in f orensics way 
Crime-f ree 
 
 
Table 6- 1 Forensics Design Process in Details 
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The major forensics features (controls) are:  
 
 Real-Time Recording Email SENDING Event 
 Forensically Backing up Email SENDING Records  
 Structured Records 
 Hash Function 
 User Authentication and User Records 
 Fixed Email Account 
 Other Forensics Features 
 
 
6.4 Implementation 
In implementing the forensics feature development, we developed a simple email client 
with the basic function that sends emails through the Gmail Server. The code is 
constructed in C# language with the .NET platform. 
 
6.4.1 Real-Time Recording Email SENDING Event 
The email SEND EVENT is the initinal moment of this Internet based transactions. An 
email sending related record is legitimately considered as a contractual acceptance by 
businesses and law enforcements. Therefore, strong forensically sound material of 
email sending provide arguable motive of the particular email sender. 
 
Regular email client SEND EVENT (Table 6-2) includes 1) Setting up the host, defining 
client host, port number, status of using password (credential). 2) Getting Senders and 
receivers email addresses from the user interface. 3) Managing an Email message 
includes get Subject, Text Body and other relevant information. Email messages here 
are materials that have evidential value, if it is handled in a forensics way, and stored in 
a forensically sound file, or database. However, a regular SEND EVENT function does 
not protect and preserve Email messages. Meanwhile, some other evidentially valuable 
information such as Date & Time, Host Machine Info is not collected locally. 
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Table 6-3 shows a forensically sound sending event. It contains the code to keep an 
XML record of the email information (section 6.3.2 & 6.3.3) and hash function (section 
6.3.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6- 2 Sample Code 1 - Regular Email Sending Event 
 
public void Sendmail(string sentTo, string sentFrom, string Subject, 
string body)  
 { 
 try 
 {  
 // Setup Host 
 client.Host = "smtp.gmail.com"; 
 client.Port = 587; 
 client.UseDefaultCredentials = false; 
 client.Credentials = smtpcrds; 
 client.EnableSsl = true; 
 
 // Convert strings to Mailaddress 
 MailAddress to = new MailAddress(sentTo); 
 MailAddress from = new MailAddress(sentFrom); 
 
 // Set up message settings  
 msg.Subject = Subject; 
 msg.Body = body; 
 msg.From = from; 
 msg.To.Add(to); 
  
 // send email 
 client.Send(msg); 
 
 MessageBox.Show("Email Successfully sent from " + 
txtbxFrm.Text + " to " + txtbxTo.Text);  
 } 
 catch (Exception ex) 
 { 
 MessageBox.Show("Unable to send msg due to the 
following error: " + ex.Message); 
 } 
 } 
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private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
 { 
 Sendmail(txtbxTo.Text, txtbxFrm.Text, txtbxSub.Text, 
RTBoxMsg.Text); 
 } 
 
 private void XMLfile(string To, string From, string Subject, string 
Body, string Time) 
 { 
 XmlDocument xmldoc; 
 XmlElement xmlelem; 
 XmlText xto, xfrom, xsubject, xbody, xtime, xhash; 
 xmldoc = new XmlDocument(); 
 xmldoc.Load(@"c:\\logfile.xml"); 
 xmlelem = xmldoc.CreateElement("", "mail", ""); 
 XmlElement xto1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("To"); 
 XmlElement xfrom1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("From"); 
 XmlElement xsubject1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Subject"); 
 XmlElement xbody1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Body"); 
 XmlElement xtime1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Time"); 
 XmlElement xhash1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Hash"); 
 xto = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(To); 
 xfrom = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(From); 
 xsubject = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(Subject);  
 xtime = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(Time); 
 xbody = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(Body); 
 string fullMessage = To + From + Subject + Body + Time; 
 string hash = HashMessage(fullMessage, "internalstaff.smith1"); 
 xhash = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(hash); 
 //xhash = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(HashMessage(To + From + 
Subject + Body + Time, "mpp40")); 
 xto1.AppendChild(xto); 
 xfrom1.AppendChild(xfrom); 
 xsubject1.AppendChild(xsubject);  
 xtime1.AppendChild(xtime); 
 xbody1.AppendChild(xbody); 
 xhash1.AppendChild(xhash); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xto1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xfrom1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xsubject1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xtime1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xbody1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xhash1); 
 xmldoc.DocumentElement.AppendChild(xmlelem); 
 //System.Environment.CurrentDirectory ?? 
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Table 6- 3 Sample Code 2 - Forensically Sound Email Sending 
 
6.4.2 Forensically Backing up Email SENDING Records 
The email record is kept in a XML structure and stored in C:\\logfile.xml, shown in Table 
6-3. With security consideration, the records should be kept in a secure location 
remotely. This implementation focuses on forensics considerations; therefore, this 
feature only demonstrates a forensics design without security in mind. For future work, 
we propose that the email record should be kept in a remote storage in order to 
maintain the integrity of the evidence.  
 
6.4.3 Structured Record 
A structure log file is to make investigators‘ work easy so that normal functions such as 
―search‖ can be added later onto the XML log file. On the other hand, the forensics 
industry lacks a standardised evidential data format [28] [31] [32]. The XML format can 
be considered as a solution.  
 
6.4.4 Hash Function 
In Table 6-3, the code ―string hash = HashMessage(fullMessage, "internalstaff.smith1")‖ 
demonstrates that the hashed function (HashMessage) is called to hash the full email 
message with the senders email account name. The HashMessage function code is 
shown in Table 6-4. The Hash function has two purposes; one is to create the hash 
value for full email messages for later evaluation. Second reason is the sender‘s email 
 try 
 { 
 xmldoc.Save("c:\\logfile.xml"); //I've chosen the c:\ for the resulting 
file pavel.xml 
 } 
 catch (Exception e) 
 { 
 Console.WriteLine(e.Message); 
 } 
 Console.ReadLine(); 
 } 
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account name is ―salted‖ in the hash function so that the sender cannot deny that a 
transaction occurred if the hash values are identical.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6- 4 Sample Code 3 - Hash Function 
 
6.4.5 User Authentication and User Record 
The email client is used by both normal users and forensics investigators. Therefore, 
user authentication is required so that only investigators can access certain forensics 
functions, shown in Figure 6-3. Table 6-5 shows that the user account information are 
combined and applied with the SHA1 hash function. 
 
 
private string HashMessage(string fullMessage, string username) 
 { 
 // Add all content to one string 
 string stringToConvert = username + fullMessage; 
 // Convert string to data (bytes) 
 var data = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(stringToConvert); 
 // Create the hash - using SHA-256 
 var hashData = new SHA256Managed().ComputeHash(data); 
 
 
 // make an empty string 
 var resulthash = string.Empty; 
 
 // for each byte in the resulting hash, add to the string.  
 foreach (var b in hashData) 
 { 
 //X2 is the Hexadecimal formatting for toString 
 resulthash += b.ToString("X2"); 
 } 
 
 return resulthash; 
 } 
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Figure 6- 3 User Authentication Interface 
 
Table 6- 5 Sample Code 4 - SHA1 Hash 
 
private bool checkInvestigatorCredential() // Check the Investigators 
Cred 
 { 
 var PlaintextEnter = txtboxUserName.Text + txtBoxPwd.Text;  
 var InvestigatorData = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(PlaintextEnter); 
 var Credhash = new SHA1Managed().ComputeHash(InvestigatorData); 
 var resulthash = string.Empty; 
 
 foreach (var b in Credhash) 
 { 
 resulthash += b.ToString("X2"); 
 } 
 return resulthash.Equals(investigatorCredentials); 
 } 
 
private bool checkUserCredential() // Check the user's Credential 
 { 
 var PlaintextEnter = txtboxUserName.Text + txtBoxPwd.Text;  
 
 var UserData = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(PlaintextEnter); 
 var UserDatahash = new SHA1Managed().ComputeHash(UserData); 
 var resulthash = string.Empty; 
 
 foreach (var b in UserDatahash) 
 { 
 resulthash += b.ToString("X2"); 
 } 
 return resulthash.Equals(UserCredentials); 
 } 
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The regular users have to login to use email functions. For investigators, additional 
information needs to be recorded; Figure 6-3 prompts an interface for investigators to 
enter the search warrant information. The importance of search warrants is described in 
[64]. 
 
 
 
Figure 6- 4 Search Warrant Information Enter 
 
6.4.6 Fixed Email Account 
Non-repudiation is one of the most important forensics attributes that should be 
maintained within an email sending process. It ensures that parties who made the email 
sending cannot deny that a transaction occurred. To ensure non-repudiation, the email 
client requires a group of features collect, maintain, and present the email sending 
materials in a forensics manner. In a forensically designed email client, the normal user 
account has already been fixed through the company policy. Therefore, the users do not 
need to type the sender‘s information. Figure 6-5 shows that the ―From‖ tag has been 
greyed out for this feature. 
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Figure 6- 5 Fixed Email User Account 
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6.4.7 Other Forensics Features 
Other forensics features helps to provide a unique signature of the targeted computer 
where the evidence was collected. Figure 6-5 and Table 6-6 demonstrates the interface 
and sample code respectively. According to Figure 6-5, the target machine name is 
COSC964; Domain Name is UOCNT, etc.  
 
 
 
Figure 6- 6 Host Information Interface 
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Table 6- 6 Sample Code 5 - Host Information 
  
 
private void GetSysInfo() 
 { 
 DateTime time = DateTime.Now; 
 txtboxHostname.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxHostname.Text = System.Environment.MachineName; 
 
 txtboxDomain.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxDomain.Text = System.Environment.UserDomainName; 
 
 txtboxOSversion.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxOSversion.Text = System.Environment.OSVersion.ToString(); 
 
 txtboxLogintime.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxLogintime.Text = time.ToString(); 
 } 
 
private void GetHardwareinfo() 
 { 
 System.Management.ManagementClass ObjectiveClass = new 
System.Management.ManagementClass("Win32_NetworkAdapter"); 
 foreach(System.Management.ManagementObject objMgmt in 
ObjectiveClass.GetInstances()) 
 { 
 lstBoxManuinfo.Items.Add( 
 "Manufacturer :" + objMgmt["Manufacturer"] + " " + 
 "Adapter Name :" + objMgmt["Caption"] + " " + 
 "MACAddress :" + objMgmt["MACAddress"]); 
 } 
 } 
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7 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes this thesis and introduces future works. In the future works 
section, we focus on the improvement of the forensics overlay and the future 
implementation of the forensically sound application development.  
 
Chapter Seven: 
7.1 Summarises the Thesis  
7.2 Describes Future Works 
 
7.1 Summary 
Current business/forensics environments require a comprehensive model that covers 
business/forensics decision making, processing, and enhancing capability. The new 
model is built through a combination of digital forensics knowledge and an enterprise 
security model - SABSA. This thesis describes the process of construction of the new 
model – The Forensics Overlay. 
 
The thesis also describes the current digital forensics trends in an enterprise/network 
environment and argues that developing a forensically sound business application is a 
solution to deal with enterprise forensics, rather than the overreliance on forensics tools.  
 
To test the usability of the forensics overlay, this thesis demonstrates the process of 
using the overlay to assist a forensically sound email design and development.  
 
7.1.1 Results of a Forensically Sound Email Design 
The result from the email client design indicates that the overlay layers are easily 
mapped into the system development lifecycle (SDLC). The connection between layers 
forms seamless traceability from business/forensics requirements to business/forensics 
features. The other cells in the overlay provide an overall picture for senior executives to 
understand the forensics projects in relevant levels.  
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The contents in each cell of the overlay focuses on the later software development 
process. Therefore, not all original SABSA cells are addressed since some have strong 
focus on business cases.  
 
The design process follows the simple waterfall SDLC model. In the requirement phase, 
the overlay‘s contextual layer is used, mainly with the contextual asset cells contain ing 
the forensics/business drivers. The collection of the selected drivers helps prevent 
related email client cybercrimes and helps the evidence collection after a cyber incident 
has occurred. The overlay only provides the forensics requirements and may possibly 
ignore the issues of security and privacy. Therefore, further development is needed to 
create a practical application.  
 
In the design phase, the overlay‘s conceptual, logical and physical layer is used to 
generate the application features according to the outcome of the contextual layer. The 
design phase not only determines the forensics features but also generates the related 
documentation of the application‘s forensics attributes, forensics services and forensics 
controls. The outcome of the forensics features are derived from the contextual layer‘s 
requirements. Therefore, these features contain functions only related to forensics. For 
example, the email client forensically saves the email contents in a XML structure 
locally, which is not as secure as saving the XML file in remote forensics data storage.  
 
Compared with other forensics models, the overlay focuses on 1) initial business 
requirements; 2) traceability design; and 3) forensics concerns.  
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7.1.2 Result of a Forensically Sound Email Development 
In a live forensics situation, the forensically sound email generates materials that fulfill 
the rules of evidence. Two evidence files are either available for live forensics in a crime 
scene or their copies can be made available for static forensics. These two evidence 
files are one XML file which contains all email contents, and one text file which contains 
the investigators information, search warrant information, the target system and 
hardware manufactory information. Compared with Microsoft Outlook, this email client 
has three major advantages. First, both files are secured by hash functions so that even 
with live investigation, the file integrity is maintained. Second, one of the files that 
contain the email contents is structured in an XML format. It is a standardised file format 
which is considered as the next generation evidential file format [34]. Third, this email 
client has separate accounts for regular users and digital investigators; this increases 
the authenticity and reliability of the evidence. More details about this email client are 
explained through the four major rules of evidence: admissibility, authenticity, integrity, 
and reliability.  
 
Admissibility  
Evidence is collected including the investigators‘ details and search warrant information. 
It proves that the evidence is retrieved by qualified forensics investigators. All details are 
hashed and kept in the local storage. When static forensics is later applied in a 
forensics lab, forensics tools are able to retrieve this file as additional evidence that 
testify the legitimacy of the investigation process. 
 
The search warrant information is bound with the investigation case ID, investigators‘ 
name, and the email account to avoid the investigation to pass beyond the scope of its 
search warrant.  
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Authenticity  
Compared with normal email clients, the forensically sound email client has two 
accounts: the normal user login and the investigator login. These two accounts are 
isolated and dedicated to different tasks. Both accounts are protected by an 
authentication method. In the evidence file, both accounts are bound with the full email 
message and the hash function is applied. Therefore, any forged data should be 
disclosed by comparing the hash values. The target system and hardware manufactory 
information are also collected as additional evidence to prove the source of the 
evidence. 
 
Integrity 
The evidence integrity is maintained by all hash functions. There are two major hash 
functions applied in the email client. Firstly, the hash function is applied to a collective 
message of Email Receivers, Email Senders, Email Body and Sent Time/Date. In 
addition, the email account name is hashed with the above collective messages. The 
hash value of this message is stored in one XML node. Therefore, the integrity of email 
contents is maintained. Secondly, evidence files which contain the target system and 
hardware manufactory information and investigator‘s information, are hashed results in 
recording the hash value in a local text file.  
 
Reliability 
The evidence collection features is contained in the Email Sending Event. It is a live 
evidence collection process by a single click of the SEND button. All records are kept in 
an XML form and hashed to keep intact. These records are later collected by 
investigators when necessary. 
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7.2 Future Works 
Both the overlay and the concept of the forensically sound feature (FSF) need to be 
constantly updated with current forensics knowledge and the changing business IT 
environment. Future works should be carried out in the following three areas. 1) 
Additional development of the forensics overlay for a single forensically sound 
application development. 2) With businesses moving into a standardised platform for 
content management, the overlay development should focus on a forensically sound 
business environments and not a forensically sound application development. 3) Some 
businesses are moving into the cloud environment, therefore, the overlay development 
should also focus on: helping forensics-minded businesses address the cloud/forensics 
requirements in the service level agreement with cloud vendors; or helping forensics-
minded cloud vendors to understand and design forensics features in their cloud 
applications.  
 
7.2.1 Additional Development for the Forensics Overlay 
 
Focusing on General Business/Forensics Issues  
The current forensics overlay attempts to solve the issues in a forensically sound 
application development. Therefore, more software development issues are addressed 
in the existing cells. Additional development of the overlay should avoid the focus on 
software development issues. Instead, the future overlay should concentrate on 
forensics related business projects.  
 
Populating Overlay Cells 
Some cells are left blank since they provide less help on software development. The 
future overlay should find out the business/forensics emphasis that is related to the 
intention of these cells. For example, the Physical Time Cell may address the digital 
evidence collection order with different types of data storage. In this case, more volatile 
data needs to be collected earlier than those less volatile.  
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7.2.2 A Future Development for FSFs 
 
FSFs for Business Content Management 
Due to the urge of centralised business content management [61], businesses are 
gradually integrating all their diverse applications into one single standardised platform, 
for example, using Microsoft Sharepoint as a business content management 
application. Forensically sound features (FSF) design is impacted by this trend in both a 
negative and positive way. Negatively, the complexity is higher than designing forensics 
features into one small scaled application such as an Email client. On the bright side, a 
standardised platform reduces the time and effort of the data search and data flow since 
an organisation‘s important business data is located in a single location [84]. In this 
case, it is easier for FSF to perform discovery functions to a single data location in the 
forensics manner.  
 
The Forensics Library for Software Development 
The security library benefits our forensically sound email development. For example 
hash functions are coded through a simple link with using 
―System.Security.Cryptography‖; email sending functions are coded via 
―System.Net.Mail‖; XML file management is coded via ―System.Xml‖. The future 
programming language and platform should have the similar library for forensics 
programming. These future forensics libraries may contain built-in functions such as bit-
by-bit copying, evidence file management, etc. 
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7.2.3 A Future Overlay for Cloud Computing 
The adoption of digital forensics in the emerging core business technologies such as 
cloud computing and virtualisation infrastructures is a popular topic around this industry 
[85]. It is arguable that should a business address the forensics requirements to a cloud 
vendor [89] (Situation One), or should a cloud vendor develop a forensically sound 
cloud environment for the business (Situation Two). Our discussion about future overlay 
focuses on situation two. However, in either situation the overlay should be updated 
accordingly. After all, if a business accesses their data from the cloud environment, 
simply performing digital investigation from the cloud client side is impractical. The 
cybercrime investigation requests the collaboration of both business units and the cloud 
vendors.  
 
In situation one, the first three layers of the overlay are more significant since they are 
meant to address the Service Level agreement (SLA) between businesses and cloud 
vendors [86] [89]. However, the current top concern of cloud service is still security [87]. 
Therefore, the forensics-minded organisation may not find that the forensics services 
are implemented as sophisticated as security services. 
 
Contextual, Conceptual and Logical Layers 
In situation two, the cloud vendors spontaneously designs forensics features into the 
cloud service. In this case, the forensics overlay for the cloud need to address the 
clouds vendor‘s business/forensics requirements in the contextual, conceptual and 
logical layers. Researches in this area fall short.  
 
Physical Layers 
For the overlay‘s physical layers, some recent researches express the forensics 
concerns in two areas: 1) building a forensics tunnel to provide forensics as a service 
[89]; 2) securing the cloud data provenance [90];  
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Firstly, building a forensics tunnel for the cloud client opens the accessibility to gain 
potential evidence. This raises the challenge on how to secure the tunnel. The same 
security challenge of the tunnel also affects the evidence that have been collected 
through using the tunnel. In addition, client-side usage of the forensics tunnel increases 
the risk to the entire cloud environment. Researches propose that a cloud vendor 
should only outsource its computation ability but not outsource cloud controls [91].  
 
Secondly, securing the provenance of the data protects the cloud evidence from the 
original location where evidence was generated. The research [90] discusses security 
mechanisms to protect the cloud data. However, the mechanisms are developed based 
on the requirements of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity which are conventional 
security requirements but not forensics requirements. This may raise the future cloud 
forensics researches‘ concerns on how to balance the forensics and security elements 
in a cloud environment. Some researches provide practical examples of using security 
mechanisms to achieve forensics services. In [92], a model is developed to protect 
Hospital Information System in the cloud. The model provides four functions to manage 
the cloud data - Authentication, Access Control, Authorisation, History and Data 
Logging. The first three functions are security related, but integrated well with an overall 
forensics purpose. 
 
Currently, there are ongoing researches focusing on technical model and mechanisms 
development for cloud forensics. These researches are catergorised in the overlay‘s 
physical layer. Additional research is expected to focus on the Contextual, Conceptual 
and Logical Layers. These researches are vital for cloud vendors to understand 
forensics on a strategical level as well as designing forensics into cloud policy and 
provide forensics services in a logical level.  
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A. Forensically Sound Email Development Code 
A.1 Login 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
using System.Security.Cryptography; 
 
 
namespace EmailClient 
{ 
 public partial class Form1 : Form 
{ 
 
// User's Credential is ID plus password, which is "internalstaff.smith1" + // "password"  
 private string UserCredentials = 
"4F2588A8301480FEFFFD21BE020A9FA788F25C2C"; 
 
// Investigator's Credential is ID plus password, which is "investigator" + // "yyb5494"  
 private string investigatorCredentials = 
"9C4C276806BF9539F81B4CA074C7E78EB4BFC7FD"; 
  
// For security reason, the user credentials should be stored in a secret  
// database, we only simulate the situation by hard coded the credential in // the first 
place  
  
 public Form1() 
 { 
 InitializeComponent(); 
 } 
 
// Login Button Events  
 
 private void btnLogin_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
 { 
 if (checkUserCredential() && (txtboxUserName.Text.Length > 0))  
 { 
 Form2 form2 = new Form2(txtboxUserName.Text + lblDomaim.Text); 
 this.Hide(); 
 form2.Show(); 
125 
 
 } 
 
 else if (checkInvestigatorCredential() && (txtboxUserName.Text.Length > 0))  
 { 
 Form3 form3 = new Form3(); 
 this.Hide(); 
 form3.Show(); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
 txtboxUserName.Text = "" ; 
 txtBoxPwd.Text = ""; 
 } 
 } 
 
// Check the Investigators Credentials by compare the HASH value of the login // name 
plus password 
 
 private bool checkInvestigatorCredential() { 
 var PlaintextEnter = txtboxUserName.Text + txtBoxPwd.Text;  
 var InvestigatorData = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(PlaintextEnter); 
 var Credhash = new SHA1Managed().ComputeHash(InvestigatorData); 
 var resulthash = string.Empty; 
 
 foreach (var b in Credhash) 
 { 
 resulthash += b.ToString("X2"); 
 } 
 return resulthash.Equals(investigatorCredentials); 
 } 
 
// Check the user's Credentials by compare the HASH value of the login  
// name plus password 
 
 private bool checkUserCredential() { 
 var PlaintextEnter = txtboxUserName.Text + txtBoxPwd.Text; 
 
 var UserData = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(PlaintextEnter); 
 var UserDatahash = new SHA1Managed().ComputeHash(UserData); 
 var resulthash = string.Empty; 
 
 foreach (var b in UserDatahash) 
 { 
 resulthash += b.ToString("X2"); 
 } 
 return resulthash.Equals(UserCredentials); 
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 } 
 } 
} 
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A.2 Normal User’s Email Activities 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
using System.Net; 
using System.Net.Mail; 
using System.Xml; 
using System.Security.Cryptography; 
 
namespace EmailClient 
{ 
 public partial class Form2 : Form 
 { 
 public SmtpClient client = new SmtpClient(); 
 public MailMessage msg = new MailMessage(); 
 
 private string username; 
 
// For security reason, the user‘s email account info should be stored in a // secret 
database, we only simulate the situation by hard coded the  
// email account info here  
 
 public System.Net.NetworkCredential smtpcrds = 
 new System.Net.NetworkCredential("internalstaff.smith1@gmail.com", 
"sabsaforensics"); 
 
 public Form2(string user) 
 { 
 InitializeComponent(); 
 username = user; 
 txtbxFrm.Text = username; 
 txtbxFrm.Enabled = false; 
 } 
 
// Email send Event, Call XMLfile function to store sent email contents in  
// forensics manner 
  
 private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
 { 
 Sendmail(txtbxTo.Text, txtbxFrm.Text, txtbxSub.Text, RTBoxMsg.Text);  
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 } 
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 public void Sendmail(string sentTo, string sentFrom, string Subject, string body)  
 { 
 try 
 { 
 
 // Setup Host 
 client.Host = "smtp.gmail.com"; 
 client.Port = 587; 
 client.UseDefaultCredentials = false; 
 client.Credentials = smtpcrds; 
 client.EnableSsl = true; 
 
 
 // Convert strings to Mailaddress 
 MailAddress to = new MailAddress(sentTo); 
 MailAddress from = new MailAddress(sentFrom); 
 
 
 // Set up message settings  
 msg.Subject = Subject; 
 msg.Body = body; 
 msg.From = from; 
 msg.To.Add(to); 
 DateTime time = DateTime.Now; 
 
 
 // Call XMLfile function  
 XMLfile(msg.To.ToString(), msg.From.ToString(), msg.Subject.ToString(), 
msg.Body.ToString(), time.ToString()); 
 
 
 // Send email 
 client.Send(msg); 
 MessageBox.Show("Email Successfully sent from " + "internalstaff.smith1@gmail.com" 
+ " to " + txtbxTo.Text); 
  
 } 
 catch (Exception ex) 
 { 
 MessageBox.Show("Unable to send msg due to the following error: " + ex.Message); 
 } 
 } 
  
// XMLfile function 
 
 private void XMLfile(string To, string From, string Subject, string Body, string Time) 
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 { 
 XmlDocument xmldoc; 
 XmlElement xmlelem; 
 XmlText xto, xfrom, xsubject, xbody, xtime, xhash; 
  
131 
 
 
 xmldoc = new XmlDocument(); 
 xmldoc.Load(@"C:\\Evidence\\logfile.xml"); 
 xmlelem = xmldoc.CreateElement("", "mail", ""); 
 
 XmlElement xto1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("To"); 
 XmlElement xfrom1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("From"); 
 XmlElement xsubject1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Subject"); 
 XmlElement xbody1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Body"); 
 XmlElement xtime1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Time"); 
 XmlElement xhash1 = xmldoc.CreateElement("Hash"); 
 
 xto = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(To); 
 xfrom = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(From); 
 xsubject = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(Subject);  
 xtime = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(Time); 
 xbody = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(Body); 
 
 // Hash the full message plus the user account name 
 string fullMessage = To + From + Subject + Body + Time; 
 string hash = HashMessage(fullMessage, "internalstaff.smith1"); 
 xhash = xmldoc.CreateTextNode(hash); 
 
 xto1.AppendChild(xto); 
 xfrom1.AppendChild(xfrom); 
 xsubject1.AppendChild(xsubject); 
 xtime1.AppendChild(xtime); 
 xbody1.AppendChild(xbody); 
 
 // the email content‘s Hash value, which can be used later to  
 // verify the integrit of the evidence  
 xhash1.AppendChild(xhash); 
 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xto1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xfrom1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xsubject1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xtime1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xbody1); 
 xmlelem.AppendChild(xhash1); 
 
 xmldoc.DocumentElement.AppendChild(xmlelem); 
 
 try 
 { 
 // The XML file is saved locally  
 xmldoc.Save("C:\\Evidence\\logfile.xml");  
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 } 
 catch (Exception e) 
 { 
 Console.WriteLine(e.Message); 
 } 
 Console.ReadLine(); 
 } 
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// Hash function 
 
 private string HashMessage(string fullMessage, string username) 
 { 
 // Add all content to one string 
 string stringToConvert = username + fullMessage; 
 // Convert string to data (bytes) 
 var data = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(stringToConvert); 
 // Create the hash - using SHA-256 
 var hashData = new SHA256Managed().ComputeHash(data); 
 
 
 // make an empty string 
 var resulthash = string.Empty; 
 
 // for each byte in the resulting hash, add to the string. 
 foreach (var b in hashData) 
 { 
 // X2 is the Hexadecimal formatting for toString 
 resulthash += b.ToString("X2"); 
 } 
 
 return resulthash; 
 }  
 } 
} 
 
A.3 Investigator’s Activities 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
using System.Xml; 
using System.IO; 
using System.CodeDom.Compiler; 
 
using System.Security; 
using System.Security.Cryptography; 
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates; 
134 
 
using System.Security.Cryptography.Xml; 
 
 
 
 
namespace EmailClient 
{ 
 public partial class Form3 : Form 
 { 
 private XmlDocument source; 
 private XmlDocument copy; 
 private TreeNode tree; 
 
 private string Report_SysEnvi_MachName, 
 Report_SysEnvi_DomainName, 
 Report_SysEnvi_OSVersion, 
 Report_SysEnvi_LoginTime, 
 Report_XMLfileHashValue, 
 Report_CaseName, 
 Report_ExaminerName, 
 Report_SearWarrantInfo; 
 
 public Form3() 
 { 
 
 InitializeComponent(); 
 
 // The program will automatically gain sys info and hardware info  
 // as a computer ID evidnece 
 
 GetSysInfo(); 
 GetHardwareinfo(); 
 source = new XmlDocument(); 
 
 // The evidence will be load into investigator‘s interface for live  
 // forensics 
 
 source.Load("C:\\Evidence\\logfile.xml"); 
 copy = null; 
 tree = null; 
 
 // Call the ShowXML function to show email sending history  
 ShowXML(); 
 
 // Get the hash value of the file so that not only the file 
 // content has a hash value, but also the evidence report file 
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 // itself are hashed  
 Report_XMLfileHashValue = ComputeSHA1Hash("C:\\Evidence\\logfile.xml"); 
 } 
 
// This function collects the System info 
 p r i v a t e  v o i d  G e t S y s I n f o ( ) 
 { 
 DateTime time = DateTime.Now; 
 txtboxHostname.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxHostname.Text = System.Environment.MachineName; 
 Report_SysEnvi_MachName = System.Environment.MachineName; 
 
 txtboxDomain.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxDomain.Text = System.Environment.UserDomainName; 
 Report_SysEnvi_DomainName = System.Environment.UserDomainName; 
 
 txtboxOSversion.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxOSversion.Text = System.Environment.OSVersion.ToString(); 
 Report_SysEnvi_OSVersion = System.Environment.OSVersion.ToString(); 
 
 txtboxLogintime.Enabled = false; 
 txtboxLogintime.Text = time.ToString(); 
 Report_SysEnvi_LoginTime = time.ToString();  
 } 
 
 
 
// This function collects the computer hardware manufactory info 
 private void GetHardwareinfo() 
 { 
 System.Management.ManagementClass ObjectiveClass = new 
System.Management.ManagementClass("Win32_NetworkAdapter"); 
 foreach(System.Management.ManagementObject objMgmt in 
ObjectiveClass.GetInstances())  
 { 
 lstBoxManuinfo.Items.Add( 
 "Manufacturer :" + objMgmt["Manufacturer"] + " " + 
 "Adapter Name :" + objMgmt["Caption"] + " " + 
 "MACAddress :" + objMgmt["MACAddress"]); 
 } 
 } 
 
// This button click event create a txt file with collected information 
 private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
 { 
 try 
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 { 
  
 Report_CaseName = txtboxCaseName.Text;  
 Report_ExaminerName = txtboxExamName.Text; 
 Report_SearWarrantInfo = rtbox.Text; 
 StreamWriter SW; 
 SW = File.CreateText("C:\\Evidence\\myfile.txt"); 
 SW.WriteLine("Case Name:" + Report_CaseName); 
 SW.WriteLine("Examiner's Name:" + Report_ExaminerName); 
 SW.WriteLine("Search Warrant Information:" + Report_SearWarrantInfo); 
 SW.WriteLine("Suspect's Machine Name: " + Report_SysEnvi_MachName); 
 SW.WriteLine("Suspect's Domain Name:" + Report_SysEnvi_DomainName); 
 SW.WriteLine("Suspect's OS Version:" + Report_SysEnvi_OSVersion); 
 SW.WriteLine("Investigator's Login Time:" + Report_SysEnvi_LoginTime); 
 SW.WriteLine("XMLfileHashValue:" + Report_XMLfileHashValue); 
 SW.Close(); 
 } 
 catch (Exception ex) 
 { 
 MessageBox.Show("Report Generation Failure: " + ex.Message); 
 } 
  
 } 
 
// This function shows the XMLfile contents (email sending history) in  
// investigator intreface 
 private void ShowXML() 
 { 
 // determine if copy has been built already 
 if (copy != null) 
 return; // document already exists 
 
 // instantiate XmlDocument and TreeNode 
 copy = new XmlDocument(); 
 tree = new TreeNode(); 
 
 // add root node name to TreeNode and add TreeNode to TreeView control 
 tree.Text = source.Name; // assigns #root 
 treeView1.Nodes.Add(tree); 
 
 // build node and tree hierarchy 
 BuildTree(source, copy, tree); 
 } 
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 private void BuildTree(XmlNode xmlSourceNode, XmlNode document, TreeNode 
treeNode) 
 { 
 // create XmlNodeReader to access XML document 
 XmlNodeReader nodeReader = new XmlNodeReader(xmlSourceNode); 
 
 // represents current node in DOM tree 
 XmlNode currentNode = null; 
 
 // treeNode to add to existing tree 
 TreeNode newNode = new TreeNode(); 
 
 // references modified node type for create node 
 XmlNodeType modifiedNodeType; 
 
 while (nodeReader.Read()) 
 { 
 // get current node type 
 modifiedNodeType = nodeReader.NodeType; 
 
 // check for EndElement, store as Element 
 if (modifiedNodeType == XmlNodeType.EndElement) 
 modifiedNodeType = XmlNodeType.Element; 
 
 // create node copy 
 currentNode = copy.CreateNode(modifiedNodeType, nodeReader.Name, 
nodeReader.NamespaceURI); 
 
 // build tree based on node type 
 switch (nodeReader.NodeType) 
 { 
 // if Text node, add its value to tree 
 case XmlNodeType.Text: 
 newNode.Text = nodeReader.Value; 
 treeNode.Nodes.Add(newNode); 
 
 // append Text node value to currentNode data 
 ((XmlText)currentNode).AppendData(nodeReader.Value);  
 document.AppendChild(currentNode); 
 break; 
 
 // if EndElement, move up tree 
 case XmlNodeType.EndElement: 
 document = document.ParentNode; 
 treeNode = treeNode.Parent; 
 break; 
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 // if new element, add name and traverse tree 
 case XmlNodeType.Element: 
 
 // determine if element contains content 
 if (!nodeReader.IsEmptyElement) 
 { 
 // assign node text, add newNode as child 
 newNode.Text = nodeReader.Name; 
 treeNode.Nodes.Add(newNode); 
 
 // set treeNode to last child 
 treeNode = newNode; 
 document.AppendChild(currentNode); 
 document = document.LastChild; 
 } 
 else // do not traverse empty elements 
 { 
 // assign NodeType string to newNode 
 newNode.Text = nodeReader.NodeType.ToString();  
 treeNode.Nodes.Add(newNode); 
 document.AppendChild(currentNode); 
 } 
 break; 
 
 // all other types, display node type 
 default: 
 newNode.Text = nodeReader.NodeType.ToString();  
 treeNode.Nodes.Add(newNode); 
 document.AppendChild(currentNode); 
 break; 
 
 } // end switch 
 
 newNode = new TreeNode(); 
 
 } // end while 
 
 // update the TreeView control 
 treeView1.ExpandAll(); 
 treeView1.Refresh(); 
 
 } // end BuildTree 
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// This function calculates the hash value of the hashed Txt file  
 public static string ComputeSHA1Hash(string fileName) 
 { 
 return ComputeHash(fileName, new SHA1CryptoServiceProvider()); 
 } 
 public static string ComputeHash(string fileName, HashAlgorithm hashAlgorithm) 
 { 
 FileStream stmcheck = File.OpenRead(fileName); 
 try 
 { 
 byte[] hash = hashAlgorithm.ComputeHash(stmcheck); 
 string computed = BitConverter.ToString(hash).Replace("-", ""); 
 return computed; 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
 stmcheck.Close(); 
 } 
 } 
 
 } 
} 
 
A.4 Sample Code of an Additional Application that Compares the Hash Values 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
using System.Security; 
using System.Security.Cryptography; 
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;  
using System.Security.Cryptography.Xml; 
using System.Xml; 
using System.IO; 
 
// This is a the code of a sample application that developed to calculate the // hash value 
of the colleted evidence file, so that the hash value can be  
// compare with the one appeared in the Email Client. The identical result is // expected 
to prove the integrity of the evidnce file and contents  
 
namespace XMLfile 
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{ 
 public partial class Form1 : Form 
 { 
 public Form1() 
 { 
 InitializeComponent(); 
 } 
 
 private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
 { 
 textBox1.Text = ComputeSHA1Hash("C:\\Evidence\\logfile.xml"); 
 } 
 
 public static string ComputeSHA1Hash(string fileName) 
 { 
 return ComputeHash(fileName, new SHA1CryptoServiceProvider()); 
 } 
 
 public static string ComputeHash(string fileName, HashAlgorithm hashAlgorithm) 
 { 
 FileStream stmcheck = File.OpenRead(fileName); 
 try 
 { 
 byte[] hash = hashAlgorithm.ComputeHash(stmcheck); 
 string computed = BitConverter.ToString(hash).Replace("-", ""); 
 return computed; 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
 stmcheck.Close(); 
 } 
 } 
 
 } 
} 
 
 
